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Introduction 
There is growing and widespread interest among policymakers at all levels
of government in recent years to promote entrepreneurial-friendly environ-
ments and entrepreneurship in terms of both self-employment and business
ownership. The interest is motivated by a substantial body of research indi-
cating that entrepreneurs spur the diffusion and implementation of
innovative ideas, thereby creating new products, services, and markets. In
addition, and perhaps more importantly, entrepreneurs contribute, whether
through self-employment or the establishment of small businesses, to job
formation and economic growth and development. Some consider self-
employment, moreover, a route out of poverty or off the unemployment
rolls for some individuals, especially those encountering discrimination in
the labor market. Self-employment may even be a way to increase one’s
earnings, as compared to working for someone else. All these factors play a
role in governmental efforts to foster entrepreneurship, in terms of both
self-employment and business ownership, particularly in low- and moder-
ate-income (LMI) communities. 
While there may be convincing evidence demonstrating the importance
of entrepreneurship for increasing social welfare, there is some uncertainty
about the most important determinants of entrepreneurship and, hence,
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two levels at which this uncertainty arises. The first is at the level of indi-
vidual entrepreneurship itself. It is not fully known why some individuals
become entrepreneurs, while others become wage or salary workers. The
second level of uncertainty pertains to the factors most responsible for
enabling or preventing a would-be entrepreneur from becoming self-
employed or establishing a business. Both of these issues have been studied,
but researchers, so far, have failed to reach enough of a consensus to provide
a true road map to meaningful policy actions. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore several aspects of the various
efforts that have been made in recent years to understand better what works
best at promoting entrepreneurship throughout the United States, espe-
cially in the LMI communities. This is obviously an extremely important
issue but, nonetheless, a difficult challenge for any researcher. Our approach
to addressing the topic is to rely mainly on the work of other researchers,
but also to make a modest attempt to contribute to the research in the area. 
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we
briefly discuss the importance of entrepreneurial activity in contribution to
economic growth and development, and social welfare more broadly. The third
section focuses more narrowly on the commitment of financial institutions to
channel loans to businesses in LMI communities. The fourth section focuses on
a newly constructed measure indicating the degree of “loan bias” that exists in
these communities. The fifth section focuses on selected databases that are avail-
able to study entrepreneurship, various empirical studies that have examined
several determinants of different measures of entrepreneurial activity, and
potential stumbling blocks or barriers to entrepreneurship considered by these
studies. It also identifies inconsistencies in findings and the lack of common
data sources that limit the confidence that one can have in any proposed policy
actions to foster greater entrepreneurship. The sixth section discusses the types
of regulatory stumbling blocks that may impede the development of greater
entrepreneurial activity.
The seventh section changes pace and discusses an alternative approach
to trying to identify those factors that help explain the differences in
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 entrepreneurial activity across geographical regions. The approach is to
focus on the size distribution of businesses in different regions of the
country, based upon the notion that relatively smaller firms, in contrast
to relatively bigger firms, contain the breeding grounds for the initial
expression of the entrepreneurial spirit, no matter where those firms are
located. The eighth and last section contains a summary and conclusions. 
Overview of the importance of entrepreneurship
Economic theory does not provide clear guidance on providing an opera-
tional way in which to classify entrepreneurs from nonentrepreneurs. For
example, Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979, p. 720) develop a theoretical model and
find “that less-risk-averse individuals become entrepreneurs, while the more-
risk-averse work as laborers.” As another example, Lucas (1978, p. 510)
constructs a model in which “each member of the workforce is endowed with
a ‘talent for managing’ which varies across workers.” Thus, either innate differ-
ences in attitudes toward risk or talents for managing are used to explain why
some individuals are entrepreneurs and others are paid workers. More generally,
as Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1994a, p. 338) state, “in the nonstatistical litera-
ture…entrepreneurs are characterized in terms of their daring, risk-taking,
animal spirits, and so on….” Those who study entrepreneurship empirically,
however, require a more concrete way in which to identify entrepreneurs that is
more amenable to measurement in order to examine various factors that may
help explain differences in the degree of entrepreneurship that exists over time
and across geographical regions.
Thomas Hoenig (2005, p. 2), president of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, in this regard, suggests that the entrepreneur is someone who
recognizes “the potential of new ideas, designs applications, develops new
products, and successfully brings these products to markets.” Based on this
definition, individuals who are self-employed or own relatively small busi-
nesses could be considered entrepreneurs. At the very least, they are
entrepreneurial enough to bring products and services to the marketplace.
Indeed, among the empirical studies of entrepreneurship, Evans and
Leighton (1989), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), and Fairlie (1999) use
self-employment to define entrepreneurs; Gentry and Hubbard (2004) use
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 business ownership; Meyer (1990) uses both self-employment and business
ownership status; and Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994a, b) use
filers of IRS form 1040 schedule C to define entrepreneurs. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide data on the economic impact of entrepreneurship.
Table 1 shows that small businesses are extremely important for employ-
ment and economic growth. Specifically, it shows that small businesses
(that is to say, those with fewer than 500 employees) account for 99 percent
of all firms in the United States, 86 percent of all establishments, 50 percent
of total employment, 45 percent of annual payroll, and 39 percent of total
receipts. Enterprises with zero to five employees, moreover, account for 47
percent of all firms and 37 percent of all establishments.1 These enterprises,
not surprisingly, account for only 5 percent of employment and 4 percent
of annual payroll and receipts. But from these small firms, through the
process of “creative destruction,” come the far bigger firms that help sustain
the dynamic process of job creation and economic development. Indeed,
“over the past decade, small firms [in other words, firms with fewer than
500 employees] have provided 60 to 80 percent of the net new jobs in the
economy, and…almost all of these net new jobs stem from startups in the
first two years of operation” (U.S. Small Business Administration Office of
Advocacy and the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, 2004). Further-
more, Acs and Armington (2004) empirically find that a higher ratio of
entrepreneurial activity is associated strongly with faster growth of local
economies. It, therefore, is incumbent upon policymakers concerned with
growth and employment not to erect stumbling blocks or, worse yet, barri-
ers to the establishment and operation of small businesses.
Table 2 provides a somewhat broader view of the role of small business in
the economy because it includes the self-employed. But, it also provides a
note of caution insofar as it provides information on the race/ethnicity and
gender of owners of firms. It is important for social welfare that all races,
ethnicities, and genders are provided the opportunity to become self-
employed or small business owners. Recent demographic data showing the
growing importance of different social and ethnic groups in the total popu-
lation only underscore this fact. Yet, Table 2 raises the issue as to whether
this opportunity is indeed available to individuals in all these groups. It
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Table 1
Number of Firms, Number of Establishments, Employment, Annual
Payroll, and Receipts by Employment Size of the Enterprise
Table 2
Number of Firms, Receipts, Employment, and Annual Payroll by
Race/Ethnicity and Gender
Data Type Total Employment Size of the Enterprise
0 % 1-4 % 5-9 % 10-19 % 20-99 % 100-499 % 500+ %
Firms (thousands) 5,698 770 14% 2,696 47% 1,011 18% 614 11% 508 9% 82 1% 17 0%
Establishments (thousands) 7,201 771 11% 2,699 37% 1,024 14% 653 9% 693 10% 333 5% 1,028 14%
Employment (thousands) 112,401 0 0% 5,698 5% 6,640 6% 8,246 7% 19,874 18% 15,909 14% 56,034 50%
Annual payroll (US$ billions) 3,943 38 1% 156 4% 182 5% 241 6% 624 16% 536 14% 2,166 55%
Receipts (US$ billions) 22,063 215 1% 938 4% 888 4% 1,086 5% 2,885 13% 2,547 12% 13,504 61%
Source: 2002 County Business Patterns
Population Number of Firms Receipts Number of Employees Annual Payroll
(millions) (thousands) (billions) (thousands) (billions)
All U.S. 281 22,977 22,635 110,833 3,815
Male 49% 57% 31% 39% 35%
Female 51% 28% 4% 7% 5%
Black 35 1,198 93 771 18
Male 48% 48% 70% 65% 70%
Female 52% 46% 23% 23% 22%
White 211 19,895 8,304 52,209 1,549
Male 49% 60% 81% 78% 82%
Female 51% 28% 10% 13% 10%
Asian 10 1,105 343 2,294 59
Male 48% 58% 73% 68% 73%
Female 52% 31% 16% 19% 17%
Hispanic 35 1,574 226 1,546 37
Male 51% 59% 76% 72% 76%
Female 49% 34% 16% 18% 17%
Source: 2002 Survey of Business Owners
Note: Minimum 50 percent ownership required for gender designation. Percentages may not add to 100 because of firms with equal 
male-female ownership.shows the ownership distribution of firms based upon different demographic
characteristics.2 More importantly, however, is the fact that it compares the
distribution of the ownership of businesses in terms of the population among
the different races/ethnicities and genders to the distribution of the number
of firms, receipts, employees, and payroll among these same demographic
groups. One finds a striking imbalance in the different distributions.
The percentage of the population accounted for by females, for instance, indi-
cates that they are significantly underrepresented as majority owners of firms
and especially so with respect to receipts and employment of firms. Females
represent 51 percent of the population but just 12 percent of receipts and 14
percent of employment of firms that are majority-controlled by a single gender.
African-Americans and Hispanics also are underrepresented in terms of self-
employment or ownership along the various dimensions indicated in
comparison to their respective percentages of the total population. African-
Americans comprise some 12 percent of the population but a mere 5 percent of
the number of firms that are majority-controlled by a single race. This disparity
is even more striking if one considers receipts and employment, where African-
American-owned firms account for just 1 percent of receipts and employment.
Hispanics account for 13 percent of the population but just 7 percent of firms
and 3 percent of receipts and employment. Conversely, Asian-Americans
comprise shares of firm employment and receipts in approximate parity to their
share of the population and comprise a share of firm numbers higher than their
share of population. 
This type of information raises important questions about potential
stumbling blocks, if not downright barriers, to individuals in several differ-
ent demographic groups for becoming self-employed or business owners. It
also suggests, however, that these potential hurdles may be less important,
if not unimportant, for at least one minority group. The fact that many
individuals from these demographic groups are also in LMI communities
only intensifies the importance of such questions. The reason, of course, is
that to limit the opportunities of these individuals to become self-employed
or establish small businesses is to limit the opportunities of a large and
increasing potential portion of the U.S. population to grow and prosper
through entrepreneurship. One of the limiting factors most frequently
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 mentioned is lack of access to capital. We explore this issue further in the
next section.  
Some potential stumbling blocks to entrepreneurial activity in
LMI communities
Many studies of the determinants of entrepreneurship frequently
mention that a major barrier to entrepreneurship (that is to say, self-
employment or establishing a small business) is lack of access to funds, or
what is referred to as “liquidity constraints.” The enactment of the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), however, requires that
banks channel a portion of their funds to the communities in which they
are located. Appendix 1 shows the percentage of the population in each of
the 280 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that is accounted for by LMI3
individuals and the percentage of the total amount of loans made to busi-
nesses in these communities by banks under CRA4 in 2000. It is important
to note, however, that only banks with assets of greater than $250 million
were required to report under CRA in 2000 (this minimum was increased
to $1 billion in 2005). Reporting banks, moreover, are required to report
data only on loans of $1 million in size or less. For these reasons, CRA data
can be viewed as data on the small business lending of banks that accounted
for more than 90 percent of total bank assets and business loans in 2000.5
Additionally, for our analysis in this section, we assume that LMI individ-
uals live mainly in LMI census tracts, rather than being located randomly
throughout the census tracts in MSAs. This assumption seems plausible
given that the U.S. Census Bureau notes that census tracts are “designed to
be relatively homogeneous units with respect to population characteristics,
economic status, and living conditions.”
It is quite clear that the distribution of the LMI population as a percent-
age of an MSA’s total population varies substantially across the MSAs—the
mean is 40 percent, and the standard deviation is 0.03 percent. The shares
range from a high of 49 percent in Yolo, Calif., to a low of 34 percent in
Jacksonville, N.C. Bank loans made by reporting banks to businesses in the
LMI communities as a percentage of the total amount of bank loans made
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 in these MSAs varies even more widely—the mean is 23 percent, and the
standard deviation is 0.10 percent. These figures range from a high of 54
percent in Des Moines, Iowa, to a low of 0.2 percent in Dover, Del. Inter-
estingly, the mean share of loans made to businesses in LMI communities
is substantially lower than the mean of the LMI population as a share of the
total population. Indeed, it is more than 40 percent lower. 
When one focuses on just low-income (LI) communities, one finds that
the share of the total population in MSAs accounted for by the LI segment
ranges from a high of 32 percent in Yolo, Calif., to a low of 16 percent in
Jacksonville, N.C. The mean is 23 percent, and the standard deviation is
0.03 percent. At the same time, the share of the total amount of loans made
by reporting banks to businesses in LI communities ranges from a high of
28 percent in Sioux City, Iowa-Neb. to a low of 0 percent in each of 45
MSAs. The mean share of loans made to businesses in LI communities is a
mere 6 percent (in other words, 75 percent lower than the mean of the LI
population as a share of the total population), and the standard deviation is
0.05 percent—the latter figure quite lower than the variation of the share of
loans made to businesses in LMI communities.
The idea of parity between share of population and share of business activity
is one which seems to hold appeal for some commentators on entrepreneurship,
particularly with respect to entrepreneurship in minority populations. This can
be seen in The State of Minority Business (Minority Business Development
Agency, 2001), which notes that “minority-owned business activity…continues
to be significantly smaller than minority representation of the nation’s popula-
tion.” It describes this deviation from parity, moreover, as an “opportunity gap.”
In the next section, we construct a measure that reflects this view—perhaps
naïve to an economist—of the relationship between share of population and
share of business activity, the latter taken here to be business loans from banks
reporting under CRA. 
In this naïve view, the ideal world is one in which the shares of the total
amount of loans made to businesses in the LMI communities in each and
every MSA would match one-for-one the shares of the total population in
the MSAs accounted for by LMI individuals. The world is far from perfect
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 based upon such a view. The difference between the LMI share of popula-
tion and share of loans made to businesses in LMI communities varies from
a high of 42 percentage points for Dover, Del. (an MSA with 42 percent
LMI individuals and 0 percent of total loans going to businesses in LMI
communities), to a low of -18 percentage points for Des Moines, Iowa (an
MSA with 36 percent LMI individuals and 54 percent of total loans going
to businesses in LMI communities). Moreover, there are only 19 MSAs out
of a total of 280 for which we have data (only 7 percent) where the differ-
ence is zero or less. The difference between the LI share of population and
share of loans to businesses in LI communities varies from a high of 31
percentage points for Yolo, Calif. (an MSA with 31 percent LI individuals
and 0 percent of total loans going to businesses in LMI communities), to a
low of  -5 percentage points for Sioux City, Iowa-Neb. (an MSA with 22
percent LI individuals and 27 percent of total loans going to businesses in
LI communities).
Table 3 shows the pairwise correlations between the LI and LMI shares
of population and the LI and LMI shares of loans, both in terms of numbers
and amounts. The LI share of the population is correlated significantly and
positively with the LI shares of numbers and amounts of loans. The corre-
lations, however, are quite low. With regard to the LMI share of population
and the LMI share of loans, either in terms of numbers or amounts, the
correlation is also positive and significant, although quite low. According to
the naïve view described previously, all the correlations would have been
positive and one.  
A measure of LMI ‘loan bias’
Another way to view the data in the previous section is in terms of an LI
and LMI community “loan bias” based on the naïve view of an ideal world
noted previously, where the share of total loans to businesses in LI/LMI
communities would be equal to the share of the total population that is
comprised by LI/LMI individuals for each and every MSA. We choose to use
the term “loan bias” not in a pejorative sense but, rather, to demonstrate that
what initially may appear to be a bias to some may require closer inspection
to determine whether this is indeed the case. Appendix 1 presents a measure











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0of the LI and LMI loan bias for each of the MSAs. It is calculated as 1 minus
the ratio of the LI/LMI share of the total amount of loans in an MSA to the
LI/LMI share of the total population in that MSA. A value of 0 would indi-
cate no loan bias, while a value of 1 would indicate maximum loan bias. The
LI loan bias ranges from 1 to -0.26. Forty-three MSAs have an LI score of 1,
meaning businesses in the LI communities received none of the loans banks
made under CRA in these MSAs. Four MSAs, on the other hand, have
scores less than 0, meaning businesses in the LI communities received a
larger percentage of the total amount of loans made in these MSAs than the
LI share of total population. The degree of LMI loan bias is only marginally
better. While no MSA has a score of 1, many, nonetheless, have relatively
high scores. Twenty MSAs have LMI loan bias scores of 0.75 or more. This
means that for businesses in the LMI communities, their share of the total
loans to all businesses in these MSAs is less than one-fourth of the LMI
communities’ share of the total population. 
Table 3 indicates that the LI share of the population of an MSA is not
correlated with LI loan bias, whereas LI share of the amount of loans is
correlated significantly and negatively with LI loan bias. The same results
hold for the correlations involving LMI shares. This means that loan bias is
less with a greater share of loans to businesses in LI/LMI communities but
is not related to the share of the population comprised by LI/LMI individ-
uals. Interestingly, the table also shows that the number of branches per
financial institution is correlated significantly and negatively with LMI loan
bias but not correlated with LI loan bias. Thus, for LMI loan bias, the
degree of financial development in the MSA, as measured by branches per
institution, matters.
The measure of LMI loan bias obviously is based upon a naïve view of the
world and, thus, simply a statistical construct. Yet, as seen previously, such
a naïve view may not be uninfluential, and our construct, therefore, may be
useful as a sort of benchmark by which to try to understand the reasons for
the substantial variation in the distributions of LMI loans and LMI popu-
lations across MSAs. Since the measure reflects smaller loans to businesses
by reporting banks, it is clear that businesses in LMI communities in some
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 MSAs receive a substantial portion of the total smaller loans to all businesses
in these MSAs compared to the LMI communities’ share of the total popu-
lation. Businesses located in still other LMI communities fare far worse in
this respect, however. Whether these differences in loan bias across the
various MSAs can be explained fully by focusing on the world of econom-
ics is the issue to which we turn next. For in free and competitive markets,
one would expect differences in loan bias across regions, but differences that
reflect economic factors, like the creditworthiness of businesses. 
We now consider a slightly less naïve view of the world in which dispro-
portionately fewer funds may flow to businesses in LMI communities in
part because the incomes in those areas also are disproportionately lower
than in other areas of MSAs. We, therefore, recalculated our measure of
loan bias, but this time, we based it on income rather than population.
Specifically, this measure of loan bias is calculated as 1 minus the ratio of
the LI/LMI share of the total amount of loans to businesses in an MSA to
the LI/LMI community share of the total income of that MSA. Interest-
ingly, the LI and LMI loan bias measures based upon population are
correlated positively and significantly with the same two respective loan bias
measures when based upon income, with correlations of 0.98 and 0.84,
respectively. However, the average LI/LMI loan bias figure based upon
population is 0.75/0.41, whereas the average LI/LMI loan bias figure based
upon income is -0.22/-0.85. This means that when one calculates the loan
bias based upon population, the share of total loans made to businesses in
LI/LMI communities, on average, is less than the LI/LMI community share
of total population in the 275 MSAs. But, when one calculates loan bias
based upon income, the share of the total amount of loans made to busi-
nesses, on average, is greater than the LI/LMI community share of total
income in the MSAs. Yet, beyond the averages, one still finds that 51
percent of the LI communities and 13 percent of the LMI communities
have positive loan bias figures based upon income. This exercise suggests
that, to the extent that income of an area correlates with the amount of
loans to businesses one might expect to be made, economic factors indeed
do help explain the reason more funds flow to some areas as compared to
others within MSAs. 
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Clearly, the naïve view of the world reflected in the ideal of parity and of
“opportunity gaps” is not compelling insofar as when one considers just
income (ignoring other factors, such as the presence of collateral, that may
affect lending decisions), much of the loan bias we noted above disappears.
Yet, there still remains substantial variation in the income-based measure of
loan bias, and an assessment of the reasons for this variation may be a fruit-
ful subject for future work. In any event, whether these measures of loan bias
have any explanatory power in explaining the number and size composition
of establishments in LMI communities within MSAs is assessed below. 
Selected databases and studies of entrepreneurship
There is a rapidly growing literature pertaining to entrepreneurship. The
focus here is on selected empirical studies that examine why some individ-
uals become entrepreneurs, while others do not. The focus is also on studies
that examine factors that explain the entrepreneurial process of starting or
owning a small business or becoming self-employed. Given our interest in
mainly empirical studies rather than theoretical studies, it seems useful to
begin with a brief overview of the different datasets that are typically used
by researchers when studying entrepreneurship. 
Table 4 provides information on what seem to be the most widely used data-
bases for studies focusing on the United States. The table shows that there are
substantial differences in the datasets in terms of the issues that can be exam-
ined. Some are longitudinal datasets that allow researchers to study the same
individuals or cohorts of the same individuals over time to determine the factors
that help explain why some individuals choose self-employment over paid
employment. Others allow researchers to focus on examining new business
startups over time, or small businesses over time or across geographical regions
rather than the choice individuals make between self-employment and wage
and salary work. Despite the different types of studies, all of these studies usually
try to include as much information as available on the characteristics of the self-
employed, the characteristics of business owners, the characteristics of the
business, and the sources of funding for becoming self-employed or establishing






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































uTable 4 shows that it is quite difficult to compare the results of studies
using these different datasets. Apart from trying to explain different meas-
ures of entrepreneurship, the various factors that one can control for in any
single study clearly are constrained by the dataset that is chosen. Thus,
different studies using different datasets necessarily cannot control for a
common and broad set of factors that might better enable one to explain
whatever measure of entrepreneurship that is employed. Yet, the omission
of any important factors may bias whatever results one obtains from a single
dataset. This is not to disparage the considerable and costly efforts to
compile all these datasets. Instead, the point is that more effort should be
made to reach a consensus on what information contained in the different
datasets can be combined and what additional information is needed to
answer the pressing issues about how policymakers can decide upon the best
actions to take to promote entrepreneurship.
To illustrate the importance of the use of different datasets, in trying to reach
a discussion on what works best to promote entrepreneurship, Table 5
provides information about several studies that have employed some of the
datasets in Table 4. There are several comments based upon these studies. First,
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) and Holtz-Eakin, Joulfarian, and Rosan
(1994a, b) find that liquidity constraints are a barrier to entrepreneurship,
whereas Vos, Yeh, Carter, and Tagg (2005); Hurst and Lusardi (2003); and
Moore (2004) do not. Second, Mitchell and Pearce (2005) find there is prej-
udicial loan discrimination against African-American and Hispanic owners of
small businesses, whereas Bostic and Lampani (1999) find loan racial disparity
for African-American-owned but not Hispanic-owned businesses, and Meyer
(1990) finds that liquidity constraints do not seem to explain the low African-
American self-employment rate. Third, Puri and Robinson (2004) find that
entrepreneurs differ from nonentrepreneurs insofar as being innately more
optimistic and risk-loving, whereas Guiso and Schivardi (2004) argue that
entrepreneurship can be acquired through learning, irrespective of such differ-
ences in attitudes. Fourth, Black and Strahan (2002) find that more bank
branches and greater consolidation in the banking industry foster entrepre-
neurship, whereas Mitchell and Pearce (2005) argue that the move by larger
banks to transactional lending through credit scores and “harder” information
may lead to greater loan discrimination against small businesses. Fifth, 
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)Peterson and Rajan (2002) find that small businesses that are distant from
lenders no longer have to be the highest-quality credits, indicating they have
greater access to credit, whereas Brevoort and Hannan (2004) find no
evidence that distance is becoming less important, but, instead, find that
distance is associated negatively with the likelihood of a local commercial loan
being made. Sixth, and last, DeYoung, Glennon, and Nigro (2004) find that
lenders making loans made to small businesses under the SBA 7(a) loan guar-
antee program experience higher default rates with greater borrower-lender
distance and higher loan guarantees. The question that immediately arises
based upon these findings is whether one confidently can suggest ways to
improve entrepreneurship, especially in LMI communities. Table 6 provides
a slightly different view of the same issue. In this table, different potential
stumbling blocks to entrepreneurship are listed across the top, while different
measures of entrepreneurship are listed down the side. In the middle of the
table are various studies of entrepreneurship that are linked to both the differ-
ent stumbling blocks and the different entrepreneurship measure. For each of
the studies, moreover, we indicate whether stumbling blocks to entrepreneur-
ial activity indeed exist. 
It is clear that there are differences among the studies as to whether or not
stumbling blocks or barriers to entrepreneurship actually exist or, even if
some do, whether they are significant. Unfortunately, differences in entre-
preneurship measures and differences in datasets make it difficult to decide
upon which results should be the best guide to policy wherever there are
contrary findings. This is certainly the case with respect to the existence of
liquidity constraints. However, there does appear to be agreement among
the studies reviewed that discrimination, particularly involving African-
Americans, is a barrier to entrepreneurship. Also, there seems to be
agreement that the existence of entrepreneurial firms in a region helps spur
the establishment of still more such firms. Furthermore, as the next section
shows, there appears to be a consensus that governmental regulations can be
stumbling blocks to entrepreneurship. Finally, there appears to be agree-
ment that individuals can learn or be taught to become entrepreneurs. At
the very least, agreement that there are indeed these types of stumbling
blocks or barriers to entrepreneurship should provide better guidance as to
Stumbling Blocks to Entrepreneurship in Low- and Moderate-Income Communities 115



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































phow to allocate available resources to the benefit of all communities, but
especially LMI communities. 
Regulatory stumbling blocks to entrepreneurship
An additional way of identifying stumbling blocks to entrepreneurship is
to ask entrepreneurs directly what they perceive to be barriers to starting
and operating a business. Every four years, the National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business conducts a nationwide survey of small business owners
known as Small Business Problems and Priorities. Table 7 includes selected
problems identified as critical by respondents to the 2004 survey. Interest-
ingly, few of the barriers studied in the empirical literature are identified as
critical by survey respondents. For instance, liquidity constraints are the
topic of numerous studies, as noted earlier—many of which find them to
be binding—yet the difficulty of obtaining long-term loans is ranked 68th,
and the difficulty of obtaining short-term loans is ranked 70th of  75 prob-
lems. Additionally, just 7 percent of respondents rated these two problems
as being of “critical” importance.  Instead, business owners tended to stress
three broad groups of problems: those that are not amenable to policy
actions (such as earnings), those that typically are beyond the scope of small
business policy (such as health care costs) and those problems that are asso-
ciated with governmental tax or regulatory policies. Indeed, as Table 7
shows, the cost of workers’ compensation insurance is ranked the third-
most important problem; business taxes are ranked fifth (see Table 8 for
difference in sales taxes across states); property taxes are ranked sixth; and
“unreasonable” government regulation is ranked the ninth-most important
stumbling block.
Anecdotal evidence for the importance of governmental regulations as
stumbling blocks to entrepreneurship is substantial. For instance, Cleve-
land, Ohio, requires any new taxicab company to have a fleet of at least 25
cars—all of which must be three years old or newer. Akron, Canton, and
Dayton, Ohio, all require potential taxicab operators to convince govern-
ment officials that their firms will meet so-called public convenience and
necessity requirements before they can begin operation.  Licensing is also a
potential stumbling block to entrepreneurship. The state of California
Stumbling Blocks to Entrepreneurship in Low- and Moderate-Income Communities 117
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Problem  Rank Percent of Respondents
Identifying as “Critical”
Employees
Cost of health insurance  1  65.6
Workers’ compensation costs  3  32.8
Locating qualified employees  11  14
FICA (Social Security) taxes  13  14.3
Unemployment compensation (UC)  19  14.4
Keeping skilled employees  28  12.4
Health/safety regulations  30  10.4
Finance
Cash flow  7  21.6
Poor earnings (profits)  12  18.6
Highly variable earnings (profits) 23  10.6
Obtaining long-term (5 years or more) 
business loans  68  6.7
Obtaining short-term 
(12 months or revolving) business loans 70  6.7
Regulation
Unreasonable government regulation  9  19.5
Frequent changes in federal 
tax laws and rules  15  12.7
State/local paperwork  17  11.6
Federal paperwork  18  12.2
Health/safety regulations  30  10.4
Taxes
Federal taxes on business income  5  23.2
Property taxes (real, personal, or inventory)  6  22.7
State taxes on business income  8  20.2
FICA (Social Security) taxes  13  14.3
Estate (death) taxes  36  17.3
Source: “Small Business Problems and Priorities,” National Federation of Independent Business
requires professions, such as landscape architects and interior decorators, to
be licensed. Furthermore, nationally, there are some 500 occupations
(including fence installers and courtroom shorthand reporters) that have
licensing requirements. Table 8 shows that there are still other stumbling
blocks, such as fees to incorporate and fees to establish limited liability
companies, which exist and vary widely across states. All these stumbling
blocks undoubtedly contribute to variation in entrepreneurial activity across
geographical regions.
Table 7
Selected Problems Identified by Small Business OwnersStumbling Blocks to Entrepreneurship in Low- and Moderate-Income Communities 119
State Name State Sales Tax (Percent) Fees to Incorporate Fees to Establish Limited
Liability Companies
Alabama 4 $40 $40 
Alaska none $250 $250 
Arizona 5.6 $60 $50 
Arkansas 6 $40 $40 
California 7.25 $100 $70 
Colorado 2.9 $50 $50 
Connecticut 6 $50 $60 
Delaware none $15 min $90 
Florida 6 $35 $100 
Georgia 4 $100 $100 
Hawaii 4 $100 $100 
Idaho 6 $100 $100 
Illinois 6.25 $150 $500 
Indiana 6 $90 $90 
Iowa 5 $50 $50 
Kansas 5.3 $90 $165 
Kentucky 6 $40 $40 
Louisiana 4 $60 $60 
Maine 5 $125 $125 
Maryland 5 $100 $100 
Massachusetts 5 $275 $500 
Michigan 6 $10 $50 
Minnesota 6.5 $135 $135 
Mississippi 7 $50 $50 
Missouri 4.225 $25 $105 
Montana none $70 $70 
Nebraska 5.5 $25 $135 
Nevada 6.5 $175 $75 
New Hampshire none $35  $35 
New Jersey 6 $125  $125 
New Mexico 5 $100  $50 
New York 4.25 $125  $200 
North Carolina 4.5 $125  $125 
North Dakota 5 $30  $125 
Ohio 6 $125 $125 
Oklahoma 4.5 $50 $100 
Oregon none $50 $50 
Pennsylvania 6 $125 $125 
Rhode Island 7 $230  $150 
South Carolina 5 $135  $110 
South Dakota 4 $125  $125 
Tennessee 7 $100 $300 
Texas 6.25 $300 $200 
Utah 4.75 $52 $52 
Vermont 6 $75 $75 
Virginia 5 $25 $100 
Washington 6.5 $175 $175 
Washington, D.C. 5.75 $150  $150 
West Virginia 6 $50  $100 
Wisconsin 5 $100 $170 
Wyoming 4 $100 $100 
Source: AT&T Small Business Resources
Table 8
State Sales Tax, Initial Fees to Establish Domestic Corporations
and Limited Liability CompaniesOther regulations that may act as stumbling blocks are those that apply
to lending. While intended to benefit borrowers, these regulations can have
the perverse effect of decreasing the availability of loans to businesses. Bank-
ruptcy exemption regulations are one such group of regulations that may
present a barrier to entrepreneurship. The liabilities of unincorporated firms
are personal liabilities of the firms’ owners, and, thus, an increase in
personal bankruptcy exemptions decreases the recovery value of defaulted
loans and, therefore, may increase the cost of loans and decrease their avail-
ability. Berkowitz and White (2000) study the impact of personal
bankruptcy exemption levels on the probability of small firms being denied
credit, using data from the 1993 “Survey of Small Business Finances,” and
they find that high exemption levels “are associated with an increase in the
probability of noncorporate firms being denied credit” (p. 446). Persad
(2004), using SBA 7(a) data, finds that personal bankruptcy exemption
levels are associated positively with default rates and also with interest rates
on loans. In addition, Barth, Cordes, and Yezer (1983 and 1986) find that
restrictions on creditor remedies (such as wage garnishment, wage assign-
ment, and deficiency judgments) have net costs to borrowers in the personal
loan market, a result that is applicable to small business finance, as the
“Survey of Small Business Finances” suggests that many small business
owners fund their operations with personal liabilities.    
An indirect approach to assessing determinants of entrepreneurship
The initial approach taken here to examining factors that may help to
explain cross-sectional variation in entrepreneurship across geographic
regions is based on the size of businesses as measured by number of employ-
ees. The analysis is based on the total number and size composition of
establishments in 204 MSAs. We examine establishments grouped into four
different size categories (zero, one to 10, 11-100, and more than 100
employees), as well as all establishments combined. To the extent that the
intensity of entrepreneurial activity is greater in smaller than bigger busi-
nesses, an examination of the determinants of the relative importance of
smaller versus bigger businesses represents an indirect approach to studying
differences in entrepreneurship across geographical regions.6
120 James R. Barth, Glenn Yago, and Betsy Zeidman
 The basic model is as follows: 
(1)  ESTij = α + β1’Dij + β2’ Pj + β3’ Fij + β4’ Bij + εij ,
where EST is either all establishments or the share of establishments as
represented by one of the four different size categories. D includes the race,
ethnic, gender, age, and educational level (four-year college degree or higher
and high school diploma or lower) composition of the population, as well
as average household income, homeownership rate, the poverty level,
unemployment rate, and number of establishments per square mile (except
in the total number of establishment regressions, in which case, only the
land area is used). P is the state sales tax rate. F is the measures of available
financial resources, about which more will be said momentarily. B is the
measures of loan bias discussed earlier (that is to say, BLMIPB = loan bias
for LMI communities based on income; BLIPB = loan bias for LI commu-
nities based on population; BLMIIB = loan bias for LMI communities
based on income; BLIIB = loan bias for LI communities based on income).
ε is a random error term, and i is a subscript for MSA, while j is a subscript
for state. 
The variables included in F are the total number of financial institutions; the
number of branches per institution; the total deposits per institution; the total
number and average size of loans to businesses made by banks under CRA; the
proportion of the number and amount of loans to businesses in LI and moder-
ate-income (MI) communities to the total number and amount of loans to all
businesses in an MSA; the proportion of the number and amount of loans made
to businesses in LMI communities to all businesses in an MSA; and the propor-
tion of the number and amount of loans made to those businesses with receipts
less than $1 million to the total number and amount of loans to all businesses.
A list of all the variables, their definitions, data sources, and summary of statis-
tics are provided in Table 9a, while Table 9b contains the pairwise correlations
for the variables. There are five basic models, one for total establishments and
four representing each of the establishment size categories (zero, one to 10, 11-
100, and more than 100 employees), with six specifications provided for each
model, with the different specifications reflecting mainly the inclusion or






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)exclusion of different combinations of the LI and MI loan variables, as will
be discussed in the next paragraph.
Tables 10 through 14 present the empirical results of our exercise. These
results may be summarized as follows:
Population
• Total population is not a significant factor in explaining the total level
or the shares of those establishments with either zero or 11-100 employ-
ees in MSAs. However, population is related positively with a larger
share of establishments with more than 100 employees, while associated
negatively with the share of establishments with one to 10 employees. 
• MSAs with larger shares of the population in the 25-44 age group
tend to have more establishments. At the same time, this segment of
the population is correlated negatively with a larger share of small
establishments (in other words, those with zero and one to 10
employees), while correlated positively with the share of establish-
ments with more than 10 employees.
Household income
• There is no evidence of any relationship between household income
and the total number of establishments in MSAs. However, the level
of household income is associated positively with the share of small
establishments (zero to 10 employees) with the coefficients in 11 of
the 12 regressions being significant at the 10 percent level or better.
It also is correlated negatively with the share of establishments with
100 or more employees.
Homeownership
• Homeownership is correlated positively but marginally with total
establishments in five of the six regressions. The results do not indi-
cate any relationship between homeownership percentage and the size
composition of establishments. 
Education
• We do not find any significant relationships between either total
establishments or the share of establishments with at least one
126 James R. Barth, Glenn Yago, and Betsy Zeidman
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Table 10
Determinants of the Total Number of Establishments in MSAs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
C -52.35 -17.4971 -18.169 -19.3771 -17.8355 -15.104  -58.0395* -57.4187* -58.2001* -57.5618*
(0.13) (0.35)  (0.33)  (0.32)  (0.34)  (0.42)  (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07)  (0.07)
DPOP 6.9919*** 0.7933 0.8025  0.8182 0.7941  0.7341 4.7605*  4.7646*  4.7656* 4.7647*
(0.00) (0.21)  (0.2)  (0.2)  (0.21)  (0.25)  (0.05)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
DAGE2544 89.4948***  36.5161**  36.887**  36.2153**  36.6461**  37.2844***  56.6351**  56.194**  56.3769**  56.2983**
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03)
DHINC -0.2693  0.0307  0.0354  0.0292  0.0318  0.0238  0.0678  0.0713  0.0687  0.0721
(0.2) (0.72)  (0.68)  (0.74)  (0.71)  (0.78)  (0.64)  (0.62)  (0.63)  (0.62)
DHOMEO 25.1614  15.0137*  15.4675*  15.716*  15.1018*  14.9274*  32.5734** 32.7334**  32.641**  32.884**
(0.2) (0.07)  (0.06)  (0.06)  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)
DCGRAD -17.8901  -1.6203 -0.9965  -2.2475  -1.3086  -1.9156  -19.1231  -19.3292  -18.9967  -19.5014
(0.35) (0.86) (0.92) (0.8) (0.89) (0.83) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)  (0.13)
DHGRAD -30.979***  -8.2244  -7.5181  -9.3567  -7.8851  -8.6132  -27.6072*** -27.6173***  -27.3728*** -27.7399***
(0.01) (0.2)  (0.25)  (0.14)  (0.22)  (0.17)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)
DWHITE 37.3751 -1.8691  -2.709 0.4799  -2.0379 -2.0295  26.8032  26.6357  26.8973  26.3373
(0.18) (0.89)  (0.84)  (0.97) (0.88)  (0.88)  (0.21)  (0.21) (0.21)  (0.22)
DBLACK 35.5407  -7.6439  -8.2912  -4.6843  -7.7413  -7.1919  25.1725  24.8345  25.2457  24.3809
(0.19) (0.56) (0.51) (0.73) (0.55) (0.59) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.22)
DASIAN 57.9889* -2.1364  -3.6306  0.2821  -2.5474 -1.6941  44.9694  44.9436 45.0031  44.6178
(0.09) (0.88)  (0.8)  (0.98)  (0.86)  (0.91)  (0.1)  (0.11) (0.1)  (0.11)
DHISP 40.2164  -5.3202  -6.307  -2.9899  -5.5578  -5.8122  26.7493  26.5794  26.7759  26.3059
(0.15) (0.7)  (0.63)  (0.83)  (0.68)  (0.67)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.18)  (0.19)
DPOV -2.2796 11.2356  11.723  10.5979  11.3069 13.996  35.5476  36.418 35.5795  36.4716
(0.94) (0.44)  (0.43)  (0.47)  (0.44)  (0.33)  (0.23)  (0.23) (0.23)  (0.23)
DUNMP -38.6361 -0.0459 0.8192  4.1101  0.2486  -3.487 -21.7382  -22.6779  -21.7235  -22.7742
(0.26) (1) (0.97)  (0.83)  (0.99)  (0.86)  (0.46)  (0.44)  (0.46)  (0.44)
DAREA 0.0005*  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0004**  0.0004**  0.0004**  0.0004**
(0.05) (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.24)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.03)  (0.03)
PTAX 0.4053  0.064  0.0598  0.0125  0.0659  0.0509  0.1419  0.1398  0.1416  0.138
(0.24) (0.76)  (0.77)  (0.94)  (0.75)  (0.81)  (0.64)  (0.64) (0.65)  (0.65)
FINSTI 54.2215***  19.7425***  19.706***  19.8558***  19.7332***  19.7511***  71.0229***  71.0204***  71.0165*** 70.9787***
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)
FBRANCH/ -1.5591 -0.0292  -0.154  -0.3516  -0.0387 0.6351  7.1136  6.9617 7.0515  6.8936
FINSTI (0.77)  (1)  (0.98)  (0.95)  (0.99)  (0.91) (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.25)
FDEPO/FINSTI -1.5591 0.0177  6.9617 7.0515  6.8936
(0.77) (0.58)  (0.24)  (0.24)  (0.25)
FALN 0.9722***  0.9726***  0.9679***  0.9725***  0.9717***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FALAVE 17.5219  19.1437  22.6161  18.2856  25.3088

























Adjusted R2  0.91 0.96  0.96  0.96  0.96  0.96  0.88  0.88  0.88  0.88
F-statistic 187.24  448.94  402.63  406.22  401.34 402.44 108.85  108.89  108.85  108.93
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Number of 
Observations 304  304  304 304  304  304  263  263  263  263
Note: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance, and p-values in parentheses. “*,”
“**,” and “***” denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.128 James R. Barth, Glenn Yago, and Betsy Zeidman
Table 11
Determinants of the Proportion of All Establishments 
with Zero Employees in MSAs
Adjusted R2 0.45 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.51
F-statistic 15.52 18.38 16.64 17.66 16.47 16.69 16.80 15.94 17.05 15.95
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of  304 304 304 304 304 304 263 263 263 263
Observations
Note: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance, and p-values in parentheses. “*,”
“**,” and “***” denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
C 30.8829*** 29.2656*** 29.43*** 27.8883*** 29.4023*** 28.6697*** 33.1876*** 31.6319*** 34.5476***32.3549***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DPOP 0.1408* -0.136 -0.1407 -0.1378 -0.1364 -0.1109 0.0407 0.0732 0.0229 0.0744
(0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.2) (0.74) (0.56) (0.85) (0.56)
DAGE2544 -19.7088*** -17.9906***-18.0376***-18.0403***-18.0329*** -18.2297*** -18.8713*** -20.3811*** -20.8687***-20.6081***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DHINC 0.0591** 0.0638** 0.0624** 0.0603** 0.0633** 0.067** 0.0352 0.0364 0.0375 0.0372
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.18) (0.19) (0.15) (0.18)
DHOMEO 0.798 0.8918 0.7458 0.8654 0.8547 0.8727 0.6195 0.7023 0.1854 0.5789
(0.6) (0.53) (0.6) (0.54) (0.54) (0.54) (0.69) (0.65) (0.91) (0.71)
DCGRAD -6.8144*** -4.1744* -4.369* -4.0379* -4.3048* -4.2408* -8.4136*** -7.2291*** -8.4427*** -7.2441***
(0.01) (0.09) (0.07) (0.1) (0.08) (0.09) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
DHGRAD -14.8809*** -12.1151***-12.3388***-12.2407***-12.2593*** -12.0993*** -17.5918*** -15.9514*** -17.7986***-15.9402***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DWHITE -8.2744** -8.576** -8.2787** -6.8336* -8.4957** -8.7224** -9.2084** -8.5682** -8.8726** -8.4037**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
DBLACK -9.955*** -10.8093***-10.5301***-8.6809*** -10.7582*** -11.2594*** -10.992*** -10.1465*** -10.5447***-9.8809***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
DASIAN -10.0449** -12.9886*** -12.47***-11.2739*** -12.7854*** -13.2606*** -11.6905*** -11.9891*** -11.401***-11.7154***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DHISP -3.723 -5.4441 -5.0977 -3.7956 -5.3289 -5.464 -4.9681 -4.835 -4.651 -4.6695
(0.32) (0.12) (0.15) (0.26) (0.13) (0.12) (0.21) (0.21) (0.24) (0.23)
DPOV -1.6707 -2.0844 -2.2035 -2.8781 -2.1236 -3.0137 -1.475 -2.5819 -0.3912 -2.1022
(0.72) (0.65) (0.63) (0.54) (0.65) (0.53) (0.76) (0.61) (0.94) (0.68)
DUNMP 1.8673 5.3184 5.0948 7.4732 5.1864 6.6717 6.9156 8.6337 5.237 8.2132
(0.83) (0.52) (0.54) (0.36) (0.53) (0.42) (0.42) (0.34) (0.54) (0.36)
DALLEST/ 3.7939 5.8303** 5.6273** 5.6892** 5.6909** 5.6316** 17.7425 21.3137 16.2277 22.493
DAREA (0.18) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.31) (0.21) (0.35) (0.2)
PTAX -0.19*** -0.1982*** -0.1976***-0.2069*** -0.1992*** -0.1941*** -0.2221*** -0.2156*** -0.2056*** -0.215***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FINSTI 0.3346 -1.4087*** -1.3929***-1.3381*** -1.399*** -1.3822*** 1.3681* 1.2787* 1.4472* 1.3137*
(0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.1) (0.06) (0.09)
FBRANCH/ -3.0738*** -2.255*** -2.2069***-2.2312*** -2.2485*** -2.4762*** -2.6224*** -2.8274*** -2.7862*** -2.7961***
FINSTI (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FDEPO/FINSTI -3.0738*** -0.0036 -2.8274*** -2.7862*** -2.7961***
(0.00) (0.37) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FALN 0.0425*** 0.0423*** 0.0413*** 0.0423*** 0.0426***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FALAVE -29.752*** -30.2232***-26.0908***-30.1226*** -30.6803***
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Table 12
Determinants of the Proportion of All Establishments
with One to 10 Employees in MSAs
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.48 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.23
F-statistic 6.12 14.95 13.55 14.42 13.73 15.17 4.92 5.66 4.53 5.43
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of  304 304 304 304 304 304 263 263 263 263
Observations
Note: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance, and p-values in parentheses. “*,”
“**,” and “***” denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.
(21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30)
C 93.1138*** 77.6937*** 77.3634***75.3165*** 76.9685*** 74.1037*** 98.0181*** 94.4051*** 98.2193*** 96.409***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DPOP -0.2336** -0.2445 -0.2489 -0.2459 -0.2462 -0.186 -0.4361** -0.3977** -0.4131** -0.3949**
(0.04) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.25) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
DAGE2544 -64.0189*** -41.7806***-41.4877***-41.871*** -41.471*** -42.361*** -62.8361*** -64.0091*** -65.2091***-64.6551***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DHINC 0.0837* 0.0685* 0.0705* 0.0626 0.0711* 0.0726* -0.0052 -0.011 0.0013 -0.0079
(0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.92) (0.83) (0.98) (0.88)
DHOMEO -5.1658 -1.2687 -1.1446 -1.2697 -1.0955 -0.4928 -7.7863** -8.0406** -7.6305** -8.2559**
(0.14) (0.67) (0.7) (0.66) (0.71) (0.87) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
DCGRAD 1.0725 7.3529 7.4891 7.5467 7.9867* 9.7572** -4.6631 -2.6662 -4.0077 -2.8131
(0.84) (0.11) (0.1) (0.1) (0.08) (0.04) (0.44) (0.64) (0.5) (0.63)
DHGRAD 0.5533 6.6116 6.7724* 6.3432 7.3187* 8.6924** -4.2323 -1.9095 -3.0972 -1.9531
(0.91) (0.1) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) (0.03) (0.43) (0.69) (0.55) (0.69)
DWHITE -23.0425* -15.6057 -15.7591 -12.6056 -15.9846 -16.336 -20.0117* -18.6537* -19.7203* -18.3901*
(0.06) (0.23) (0.21) (0.29) (0.19) (0.13) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
DBLACK -25.1313** -19.9986 -19.9302 -16.3247 -20.1597* -20.663** -21.687* -19.6609** -21.4489** -19.2468**
(0.04) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
DASIAN -20.4272 -16.7767 -17.1874 -13.8139 -17.7875 -19.211* -16.1942 -16.7962 -16.2046 -16.1189
(0.11) (0.19) (0.17) (0.25) (0.15) (0.08) (0.19) (0.12) (0.17) (0.14)
DHISP -20.1849 -16.4755 -16.6959 -13.6295 -17.0359 -16.6043 -16.8538 -16.249 -16.9178 -15.9548
(0.11) (0.2) (0.18) (0.25) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) (0.1) (0.12) (0.11)
DPOV -2.0024 -2.515 -2.1387 -3.8674 -2.2049 -7.4542 -3.9417 -7.3362 -3.2361 -5.8301
(0.85) (0.78) (0.82) (0.68) (0.81) (0.42) (0.71) (0.47) (0.75) (0.57)
DUNMP 5.8645 9.1675 9.6465 12.9711 9.8801 13.2707 -1.5469 3.1452 -2.2737 1.6654
(0.71) (0.5) (0.47) (0.34) (0.47) (0.31) (0.92) (0.84) (0.88) (0.91)
DALLEST/ 37.0554*** 31.8127*** 32.0151*** 31.515*** 32.5208*** 29.8309*** 61.002* 72.7755** 58.8491* 74.0312**
DAREA (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03)
PTAX -0.1909* -0.1514* -0.1556* -0.1686* -0.1476* -0.1169 -0.2106* -0.1992* -0.2018* -0.1984*
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.1) (0.15) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
FINSTI 0.5794 0.3086 0.2737 0.4338 0.2509 0.0146 1.7491 1.5085 1.7819 1.615
(0.22) (0.74) (0.77) (0.65) (0.79) (0.99) (0.24) (0.31) (0.23) (0.27)
FBRANCH/ -1.9647 1.1295 1.1058 1.1507 1.1079 -0.0222 -1.5584 -1.4913 -1.9898 -1.4802
FINSTI (0.24) (0.41) (0.42) (0.39) (0.42) (0.99) (0.38) (0.37) (0.27) (0.38)
FDEPO/FINSTI -1.9647 0.0075 -1.4913 -1.9898 -1.4802
(0.24) (0.47) (0.37) (0.27) (0.38)
FALN 0.0055 0.006 0.0033 0.0066 0.0093
(0.76) (0.74) (0.86) (0.72) (0.58)
FALAVE -137.4752***-136.5849***-131.1443***-135.5213***-170.9063***
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Table 13
Determinants of the Proportion of All Establishments with 
11-100 Employees in MSAs
(31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40)
C -7.1981 2.0116 1.9568 3.4213 2.0365 2.9359 -12.287** -10.5271* -13.3226** -11.4774**
(0.19) (0.71) (0.72) (0.5) (0.71) (0.58) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
DPOP -0.1168 -0.0183 -0.0197 -0.0202 -0.022 -0.0545 0.0057 -0.0112 0.0249 -0.0126
(0.12) (0.89) (0.88) (0.87) (0.86) (0.67) (0.96) (0.92) (0.83) (0.91)
DAGE2544 32.0876*** 18.6097*** 18.6675*** 18.6708*** 18.6845*** 18.9548*** 35.3272*** 35.788*** 36.3909*** 36.0906***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DHINC 0.0078 0.0164 0.0167 0.0196 0.0165 0.012 0.0537* 0.057* 0.0533* 0.0558*
(0.76) (0.45) (0.44) (0.38) (0.45) (0.58) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06)
DHOMEO 1.9593 -0.2729 -0.2601 -0.3436 -0.3023 -0.27 2.7789 2.924 3.1579 3.0539
(0.34) (0.88) (0.88) (0.85) (0.87) (0.88) (0.2) (0.17) (0.15) (0.15)
DCGRAD 4.8999 0.0983 0.1091 0.0502 0.0189 0.1172 6.7583* 5.8213 6.9256* 5.8679*
(0.12) (0.97) (0.97) (0.99) (0.99) (0.97) (0.06) (0.1) (0.05) (0.1)
DHGRAD 7.2376*** 2.5526 2.566 2.7943 2.4711 2.4685 8.9938*** 7.9328*** 9.4078*** 7.9371***
(0.01) (0.24) (0.24) (0.2) (0.25) (0.27) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
DWHITE 8.4366* 4.6491 4.6441 2.8819 4.7088 4.8717 9.4899** 8.8345** 9.2874* 8.6674**
(0.05) (0.35) (0.36) (0.52) (0.34) (0.3) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
DBLACK 3.5434 1.2417 1.2821 -0.9368 1.357 1.8785 3.8717 2.8819 3.569 2.6151
(0.39) (0.8) (0.79) (0.83) (0.78) (0.68) (0.38) (0.46) (0.43) (0.51)
DASIAN 9.1397** 8.692* 8.6531* 6.9299 8.7936* 9.138* 9.4123* 9.7012** 9.1802* 9.3622**
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05)
DHISP 3.4735 2.416 2.4014 0.7275 2.4858 2.4472 4.7315 4.4229 4.4656 4.2474
(0.42) (0.62) (0.63) (0.87) (0.61) (0.6) (0.3) (0.28) (0.34) (0.3)
DPOV 9.5649* 10.3635** 10.4323** 11.1373** 10.4551** 11.7852** 13.7282** 15.4207*** 13.023** 14.7452***
(0.08) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
DUNMP 10.3572 6.854 6.9349 4.4638 6.8419 4.8765 6.028 3.7092 7.2009 4.3421
(0.33) (0.45) (0.45) (0.62) (0.46) (0.6) (0.57) (0.73) (0.5) (0.69)
DALLEST/
DAREA -17.6569***-15.3258*** -15.3017*** -15.0627*** -15.3812***-14.9941*** -6.8599 -12.7596 -6.1309 -13.7956
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.7) (0.47) (0.73) (0.44)
PTAX 0.1365** 0.1157** 0.1149** 0.1296** 0.1143** 0.109** 0.1274** 0.1221** 0.1162* 0.1215**
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
FINSTI -0.0253 0.7539 0.7479 0.6742 0.7494 0.7264 -1.6041** -1.4853* -1.6596** -1.5337**
(0.91) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21) (0.18) (0.21) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
FBRANCH/ 5.5478*** 3.431*** 3.4304*** 3.4502*** 3.4448*** 3.7687*** 5.6606*** 5.6022*** 5.6958*** 5.5803***
FINSTI (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FDEPO/ 5.5478*** -0.0027 5.6022*** 5.6958*** 5.5803***
FINSTI (0.00) (0.62) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
FALN -0.0172 -0.0171 -0.0156 -0.0171 -0.0174
(0.22) (0.23) (0.25) (0.23) (0.24)
FALAVE 90.8097*** 90.9548*** 87.0376*** 90.7309*** 93.0853***

























Adjusted R2 0.21 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.26
F-statistic 5.77 15.61 13.96 14.88 13.99 14.37 5.80 6.29 6.02 6.21
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of 
Observations 304 304 304 304 304 304 263 263 263 263
Note: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance, and p-values in parentheses. “*,”
“**,” and “***” denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively.Table 14
Determinants of the proportion of All Establishments with 100
or More Employees in MSAs
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(41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
C -16.7986* -8.9709 -8.7502 -6.6261 -8.4072
(0.1) (0.39) (0.4) (0.49) (0.4)
DPOP 0.2096 0.3988*** 0.4093*** 0.4038*** 0.4047***
(0.18) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
DAGE2544 51.6401*** 41.1614*** 40.8578*** 41.2405*** 40.8194***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DHINC -0.1506*** -0.1487*** -0.1497*** -0.1425*** -0.151***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DHOMEO 2.4085 0.6499 0.659 0.7478 0.543
(0.46) (0.83) (0.83) (0.81) (0.86)
DCGRAD 0.842 -3.2768 -3.2292 -3.5589 -3.7009
(0.86) (0.45) (0.46) (0.41) (0.4)
DHGRAD 7.09* 2.9509 3.0004 3.1032 2.4695
(0.07) (0.42) (0.42) (0.4) (0.5)
DWHITE 22.8803** 19.5326* 19.3937* 16.5573* 19.7715**
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
DBLACK 31.5429*** 29.5662*** 29.1783*** 25.9424*** 29.5609***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DASIAN 21.3324** 21.0732** 21.0044** 18.1579* 21.7793**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
DHISP 20.4344** 19.5036* 19.3922* 16.6976* 19.879**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
DPOV -5.8919 -5.7641 -6.0902 -4.3918 -6.1267
(0.56) (0.56) (0.54) (0.66) (0.54)
DUNMP -18.089 -21.34 -21.6762 -24.9081* -21.9085
(0.25) (0.15) (0.14) (0.09) (0.14)
DALLEST/DAREA -23.1924*** -22.3171*** -22.3407*** -22.1415** -22.8306***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
PTAX 0.2444** 0.234** 0.2383** 0.2459** 0.2325**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
FINSTI -0.8887** 0.3463 0.3712 0.2301 0.3987
(0.05) (0.72) (0.71) (0.82) (0.69)
FBRANCH/FINSTI -0.5093 -2.3054 -2.3293 -2.3698* -2.3042
(0.74) (0.1) (0.1) (0.08) (0.11)
FDEPO/FINSTI -0.5093
(0.74)
FALN -0.0308 -0.0313 -0.029 -0.0318
(0.14) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13)
FALAVE 76.4174*** 75.8533*** 70.1975*** 74.913***



















Adjusted R2 0.36 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.44
F-statistic 11.17 14.18 12.84 13.68 12.93
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of Observations 304 304 304 304 304132 James R. Barth, Glenn Yago, and Betsy Zeidman
Table 14 (cont.)
(46) (47) (48) (49) (50)
C -5.7093 -18.9187* -15.5099* -19.4443** -17.2865*
(0.53) (0.06) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05)
DPOP 0.3514** 0.3896* 0.3357 0.3653* 0.3331
(0.02) (0.06) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12)
DAGE2544 41.6359*** 46.3802*** 48.6022*** 49.687*** 49.1726***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DHINC -0.1515*** -0.0838 -0.0824 -0.0922* -0.085*
(0.00) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.1)
DHOMEO -0.1098 4.3878 4.4143 4.2873 4.6232
(0.97) (0.21) (0.2) (0.22) (0.18)
DCGRAD -5.6336 6.3184 4.074 5.5248 4.1893
(0.22) (0.23) (0.43) (0.29) (0.42)
DHGRAD 0.9385 12.8303*** 9.9281** 11.488*** 9.9562**
(0.8) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DWHITE 20.1868** 19.7302* 18.3874** 19.3055** 18.1264**
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
DBLACK 30.0439*** 28.8072*** 26.9255*** 28.4246*** 26.5126***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
DASIAN 23.3336** 18.4724* 19.0841** 18.4255* 18.4721**
(0.01) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05)
DHISP 19.6211** 17.0904* 16.6611** 17.1032* 16.3769**
(0.03) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05)
DPOV -1.3173 -8.3115 -5.5027 -9.3957 -6.8129
(0.9) (0.42) (0.58) (0.35) (0.49)
DUNMP -24.8188* -11.3967 -15.4881 -10.1642 -14.2208
(0.09) (0.45) (0.33) (0.51) (0.37)
DALLEST/DAREA -20.4685** -71.8846* -81.3296** -68.9459* -82.7286**
(0.01) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03)
PTAX 0.202** 0.3053*** 0.2928*** 0.2912*** 0.292***
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
FINSTI 0.6412 -1.5131 -1.3019 -1.5695 -1.395
(0.49) (0.34) (0.42) (0.33) (0.39)
FBRANCH/FINSTI -1.2703 -1.4798 -1.2834 -0.9197 -1.304
(0.38) (0.38) (0.43) (0.6) (0.43)
FDEPO/FINSTI -0.0012 -1.2834 -0.9197 -1.304























Adjusted R2 0.46 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.38
F-statistic 14.05 9.94 10.09 8.91 9.86
Prob(F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Number of Observations 304 263 263 263 263
Note: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance, and p-values in parentheses. “*,”
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employee and educational level. But the share of the population with
at least a college degree or no more than a high school diploma tend
to be associated negatively with the share of establishments with no
employees. This negative relationship is particularly strong in the case
of the high school variable.
Race/ethnicity
• We generally do not find any consistent relationships between the
race/ethnic variables and the total number of establishments. The relation-
ships between these variables and the size composition of establishments
are more interesting. The regression results indicate that MSAs with a
larger share of the population being Hispanic are also those with a larger
share of establishments with 100 or more employees. On the other hand,
MSAs with a larger mix of white, African-American, and Asian-American
populations tend to be associated positively with a larger share of big estab-
lishments and associated negatively with a larger share of the smallest
establishments. There is also some modest evidence that MSAs with larger
Asian-American populations tend to have a larger share of establishments
with 11-100 employees. 
Poverty
• We did not find any relationships between the degree of poverty and
the number of establishments. There is also no evidence suggesting a
relationship between poverty and the share of either the smallest or
biggest establishments in MSAs. Instead, the data indicate that MSAs
with lower poverty rates tend to have a smaller proportion of
medium-sized (11-100 employees) establishments. 
Unemployment
• We do not find a relationship between unemployment rates within
MSAs and the total number of establishments or the size composition
of establishments. Only in two of the six regressions for the share of
establishments with more than 100 employees are the coefficients for
the unemployment rate negative and marginally significant. 
Land area
• Although we find no relationship between the number of establish-
ments and the land area in the MSAs, we do find a negative
relationship between establishments per square mile and the share of134 James R. Barth, Glenn Yago, and Betsy Zeidman
establishments with more than 10 employees. This relationship,
however, is positive in the regressions for the share of establishments
with fewer than 10 employees.
Sales tax rate
• We find no relationship between the state sales tax rate and the number
of total establishments in MSAs. However, we do find that a higher tax
rate tends to have a negative correlation with the share of zero-to-10-
employee establishments, whereas it tends to have a positive association
with the share of establishments with 10 or more employees.
Financial institutions
• After controlling for branches per institution, MSAs with more finan-
cial institutions tend to have more total establishments, but a smaller
share of zero-employee establishments.
• Though we do not find a relationship between branches per financial
institution within an MSA and the total number of establishments,
we find the number of branches per financial institution tends to have
a negative relationship with the share of zero-employee establish-
ments, a positive relationship with the share of 11-to-100-employee
establishments and a negative but marginally significant relationship
with the share of 100+-employee establishments. 
• After controlling for the number of institutions, deposits per institu-
tion is correlated negatively with the share of zero-employee
establishments, positively associated with the proportion of 11-to-
100-employee establishments, and has no relationship to the other
size or total establishment variables. 
Loan activity in LMI communities
• MSAs with larger numbers of loans tend to have not only more estab-
lishments, but also a larger share of zero-employee establishments. 
• We do not find a relationship between the average size of loans within
an MSA and the total number of establishments. However, we do
find that MSAs with higher-average-size loans tend to have a smaller
share of zero-to-10-employee establishments and a larger share of
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• We find marginal evidence that the higher the share of loan amounts
to businesses in LMI communities, the smaller the share of zero-
employee establishments. Yet, the marginal evidence indicates that
the higher the share of number of loans to businesses in LMI commu-
nities, the larger the share of zero-employee establishments. We do
not find that the share of the amount or number of loans to LMI
communities provides any explanatory power with respect to other
size categories of establishments.
• We do not find any significant relationship between the share of loan
amounts to businesses in LI communities and the total number of
establishments or the size composition of establishments. However,
the share of loan numbers to businesses in LI communities has a nega-
tive and significant relationship to the share of zero-employee
establishments, a negative but not significant relationship with the
share of one-to-10-employee establishments, a positive and significant
relationship with the share of 11-to-100-employee establishments, and
a positive but not significant relationship with the share of 100+-
employee establishments. 
• The share of the total amount of loans to MI communities is related
positively to only the share of establishments with one to 10 employ-
ees, while the share of the number of loans to MI communities is
related negatively to the same-size establishments. The share of the
total number of loans to MI communities also is associated positively
with a larger share of establishments with more than 100 employees.
• While the share of total amount of loans to establishments with less
than $1 million of receipts does not have a significant relationship
with the total number or size composition of establishments, the
share of the total number of loans to such establishments tends to
have a positive correlation with the share of establishments with one
to 10 employees. At the same time, the share of the total number of
loans to establishments with less than $1 million in receipts tends to
have a negative association with the share of establishments with 100
or more employees. 136 James R. Barth, Glenn Yago, and Betsy Zeidman
Loan bias
• None of the four measures of loan bias has a significant association with
the total number of establishments. However, the loan bias measure for
LMI communities based upon population is associated positively with
establishments with zero employees and those with one to 10 employ-
ees, while associated negatively with establishments with 100 or more
employees. But these significant results disappear when the loan bias
measure is based on income rather than population. 
In summary, the results indicate that several factors matter for entrepre-
neurship, as measured indirectly by the size composition of establishments
in MSAs throughout the United States. The way in which these factors are
related to entrepreneurship, however, varies depending on the size measure
used. It is useful, therefore, to summarize the findings by establishment size. 
Establishments with zero employees
One finds in MSAs that the greater the share of total establishments that
are zero-employee establishments, the lower the share of the population
aged 25 to 44, the higher the household income, the smaller the percentage
of the labor force with a college degree, and the smaller the share of the
labor force that has a high school diploma or less. In addition, one finds that
the greater the share of establishments that are zero-employee establish-
ments, the greater the race/ethnic mix of the population; the lower the state
sales tax rate; the larger the number of financial institutions; the lower the
number of branches per institution; the lower the deposits per institution;
the greater the number of loans; the lower the average loan size; the lower
the share of the total amount of loans to businesses in LMI communities in
MSAs; the larger the share of the total number of loans to businesses in LMI
communities in MSAs; and the lower the share of the total number of loans
made to businesses in LI communities. 
Establishments with one to 10 employees
Our work suggests that the greater the share of total establishments that
are one-to-10-employee establishments, the lower the share of the popula-
tion aged 25 to 44, the higher the household income, the higher thepercentage of the labor force with a college degree (in two of six regressions),
and the higher the share of the labor force that has a high school diploma
or less (in three of six regressions). In addition, one finds that the greater the
share of establishments that are one-to-10-employee establishments, the
lower the state sales tax rate; the lower the average loan size; the greater the
share of the total amount of loans to businesses in MI communities in
MSAs; the lower the share of the total number of loans to businesses in MI
communities in MSAs; and the greater the share of the total number of
loans made to establishments with receipts of less than $1 million. 
Establishments with 11 to 100 employees
The greater the share of total establishments that are 11-to-100-employee
establishments, the greater the share of the population aged 25 to 44; the
higher the poverty rate; the higher the state sales tax rate; the higher the
number of branches per institution; the higher the amount of deposits per
institution; the higher the average loan size; and the larger the share of the
total number of loans to businesses in LI communities in MSAs. 
Establishments with 100 or more employees
One finds in MSAs that the greater the share of total establishments that
are 100+-employee establishments, the higher the population of the MSA; the
higher the share of the population aged 25 to 44; the lower the household
income; the lower the race/ethnic mix of the population; the lower the unem-
ployment rate (this is a marginal result in two of six regressions); the higher
the state sales tax rate; the larger the average loan size; the higher the share of
the total number of the loans to businesses in MI communities in MSAs; and
the lower the share of the total number of loans made to establishments with
receipts of less than $1 million. 
All establishments
The findings for all establishments are important because, to the extent that
a factor increases this variable, any tradeoff between that factor’s effect on the
size composition of establishments and the number of establishments
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 becomes less important. The reason, of course, is that with more establish-
ments, a smaller share of the total for any size category can experience,
nonetheless, an absolute increase in the number of establishments. In the case
of other factors that are not significant for total establishments, but are not
significant in explaining the size composition of establishments, there are
necessarily tradeoffs (that is to say, an increase in the share of one size category
within an MSA at the expense of a decrease in both the number and the share
of one or more other size categories). In this respect, only four factors seem to
matter for the total number of establishments. These factors are the share of
population in the 25-44 age group, the homeownership rate, the number of
financial institutions, and the total number of loans made in an MSA. All four
are correlated positively with the total number of establishments. 
Clearly, the empirical results presented here emphasize the need to
develop a more general microeconomic model and to assemble better micro
data (preferably panels) to understand more fully the key determinants of
entrepreneurial activity in different geographical regions. Unfortunately, as
discussed earlier with respect to the existing literature, there is an insuffi-
cient database and no widely accepted microeconomic model yet available
to accomplish this task. This situation, however, should provide the moti-
vation for researchers and policymakers to remedy the deficiency so that
more progress can be made in identifying what works best at eliminating
stumbling blocks to entrepreneurship in LMI communities.
Policy recommendations
This paper conducts a selected review of the economic literature on entrepre-
neurship and provides some tentative empirical analyses of the determinants of
entrepreneurship across MSAs. We find that the conclusions of previous
researchers, and even our findings, are consistent in some instances with one
another and, in other instances, contradictory.  Nevertheless, based on the liter-
ature review, other papers not reviewed directly here, and our empirical analysis,
we find sufficient agreement to draw several conclusions and potential policy
recommendations aimed at increasing entrepreneurial activity, particularly in
LMI communities. These findings are as follows.
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 First, researchers frequently use different measures of entrepreneurship and
different datasets, limiting the ability to compare the work of different scholars and
hampering an understanding of the factors that influence entrepreneurship and,
thus, the development of effective policies. As noted previously, the term “entre-
preneur” means different things in different studies. For example, a recent
paper published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (Low, Hender-
son, and Weiler, 2005) identifies entrepreneurs as the self-employed, whereas
the Kauffman Foundation’s “Index of Entrepreneurial Activity” (Fairlie,
2005) identifies entrepreneurs as business owners (as reported in the “Current
Population Survey” performed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census for the
Bureau of Labor Statistics).  
One approach to addressing the problem for policymakers when researchers
use different definitions and control variables would be the construction of a
single, multiuse dataset through the creation of a data consortium that pools
information from different public and private datasets. Consortium partici-
pants might contribute data on a blind basis, with researchers and participants
gaining access to the full pool of contributed information. This would
improve upon the information that is needed to better understand the best
way to promote or to facilitate entrepreneurship.  
Second, our calculations of LI and LMI “loan bias” suggest that the financing
received by businesses in many LI and LMI communities diverges from what some,
perhaps naïvely, might consider appropriate, even when accounting for income
disparity. In general, our first measure of loan bias (based on population) indi-
cates that businesses in LI and LMI communities receive a significantly
smaller share of the total amount of loans than some might expect, given the
LI and LMI shares of population. Our second measure of loan bias (based on
income) suggests that, in a large number of MSAs, this same type of lending
gap holds. To the extent that this “bias” is not explainable by economic
factors or is the result of regulatory barriers, incentives provided through
capital access programs (in which lenders, borrowers, and the government
each contribute to a reserve fund to cover loan losses), and other credit-
enhancement programs may be appropriate to help decrease this loan bias.7
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 Third, we and others find that financial variables are important to entrepreneur-
ship. We specifically find that those MSAs with fewer financial institutions and
larger average loan sizes tend to have a smaller share of total establishments
with less than 10 employees (potentially the most entrepreneurial establish-
ments or those most associated with new startups). One potential way to
increase small business loan origination across MSAs is to increase the securi-
tization of such loans.  This would allow small business lenders to sell portions
of their loan portfolios and use the proceeds to originate more loans, as well as
lower their capital requirements.8
Fourth, discrimination appears to persist, particularly as it relates to capital
access by African-American entrepreneurs. The continued difficulty of
African-American-owned firms to gain financing, the smaller size of these
firms, and the higher concentration of larger firms in MSAs that have large
African-American populations suggest the continuing need for efforts to
extend capital and other forms of support to African-American entrepre-
neurs.  This is particularly important when one considers that the number
of these firms is growing faster than the rate of all firms, and the growth (or
lack thereof) has an increasingly significant effect on local communities.  
Fifth, taxes and government regulations clearly are potentially important
impediments to entrepreneurship. Indeed, they rank very high among the
barriers to entrepreneurship that are cited by entrepreneurs themselves.
Workers’ compensation costs, health insurance costs, taxes, and a number
of government regulations are all factors which state and federal govern-
ments could modify to promote entrepreneurship.  Often well-meaning
regulations have unanticipated consequences. For instance, high bank-
ruptcy exemptions are intended to benefit borrowers, but have been found
to actually hurt borrowers by decreasing lenders’ willingness to provide
capital.  The relationship found between lower sales taxes and greater entre-
preneurship suggests one approach to mitigating this adverse effect would
be decreased taxes. Of course, one must take account of the fact that tax
revenues help finance the infrastructure that is essential for the successful
operation of businesses.
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 Sixth, and last, there does appear to be consensus in the literature that individuals
can learn to become entrepreneurs. Well-developed training programs, with
targeted outreach, particularly to LI and LMI communities, can extend entre-
preneurship to a wider population. Unfortunately, data currently reflects
businesses located in LI and LMI communities, but tells us little about the
actual entrepreneur. Yet, the existence of entrepreneurial firms in a region spurs
the growth of more such firms in a cluster effect.  Programs such as those
supported by the Kauffman Foundation should produce greater understanding
of entrepreneurship in communities and, hence, increase the likelihood of more
new businesses being established throughout the country.
In summary, more work needs to be done to understand better the deter-
minants of entrepreneurial activity. This includes developing better
microeconomic models that capture the different tradeoffs associated with
specific policy actions affecting entrepreneurial activity and additional empir-
ical analysis to help decide which actions work best to promote such activity. 
Stumbling Blocks to Entrepreneurship in Low- and Moderate-Income Communities 141
Authors’ note: The authors are very grateful for the helpful comments and assistance provided by
Donald McCarthy, Triphon Phumiwasana, Tong Li, and Sangeetha Malaiyandi, and to constructive
comments from our discussant, Richard M. Todd.142 James R. Barth, Glenn Yago, and Betsy Zeidman
MSA  LMI Share  LMI Share LMI Loan LI Share  LI Share LI Loan
of   of Amount  Bias: Amount of of Amount  Bias: 
Population of Loans  of Loans  Population  of  Loans Amount of
Loans
Yolo, Calif. 49.1% 41.8% 0.15 31.5% 0.1% 1.00
Dutchess County, N.Y. 46.2% 18.8% 0.59 26.0% 8.8% 0.66
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, Calif. 46.1% 34.8% 0.25 24.7% 1.5% 0.94
New York, N.Y. 45.9% 19.2% 0.58 31.0% 4.8% 0.84
Oakland, Calif. 45.3% 25.4% 0.44 28.3% 13.5% 0.52
Bryan-College Station, Texas 45.1% 16.3% 0.64 29.5% 2.8% 0.90
Sacramento, Calif. 45.1% 29.6% 0.34 26.4% 7.2% 0.73
San Francisco, Calif. 44.9% 35.6% 0.21 27.2% 16.0% 0.41
Albany, Ga. 44.6% 29.9% 0.33 23.0% 15.1% 0.34
Tuscaloosa, Ala. 44.2% 18.8% 0.57 23.6% 2.6% 0.89
Riverside-San Bernardino, Calif. 43.8% 24.0% 0.45 28.4% 5.7% 0.80
Columbus, Ga.-Ala. 43.7% 37.7% 0.14 20.7% 12.0% 0.42
Yuba City, Calif. 43.6% 18.0% 0.59 19.5% 0.0% 1.00
Springfield, Mass. 43.5% 24.2% 0.44 24.6% 8.5% 0.66
Florence, S.C. 43.5% 22.5% 0.48 29.0% 8.1% 0.72
Muncie, Ind. 43.4% 21.8% 0.50 19.8% 2.7% 0.87
Huntington-Ashland, 
W. Va-Ky.-Ohio 43.4% 28.8% 0.34 26.5% 7.6% 0.71
Rocky Mount, N.C. 43.4% 8.4% 0.81 21.5% 1.2% 0.94
Missoula, Mont. 43.3% 37.2% 0.14 19.6% 0.0% 1.00
Auburn-Opelika, Ala. 43.2% 21.0% 0.51 29.6% 7.4% 0.75
Odessa-Midland, Texas 43.1% 46.5% -0.08 19.8% 5.6% 0.72
New Orleans, La. 43.1% 26.5% 0.38 29.0% 6.3% 0.78
Charleston, W. Va. 43.1% 31.6% 0.27 28.0% 15.2% 0.46
Houma, La. 43.0% 39.7% 0.08 29.3% 0.0% 1.00
Fresno, Calif. 42.9% 27.4% 0.36 19.8% 3.4% 0.83
Utica-Rome, N.Y. 42.9% 19.1% 0.55 27.5% 2.9% 0.89
Yakima, Wash. 42.9% 34.3% 0.20 18.4% 13.4% 0.27
Nassau-Suffolk, N.Y. 42.9% 12.7% 0.70 24.2% 0.1% 1.00
Bakersfield, Calif. 42.8% 21.7% 0.49 28.2% 6.5% 0.77
Louisville, Ky.-Ind. 42.8% 29.0% 0.32 22.5% 7.0% 0.69
Lake Charles, La. 42.7% 21.5% 0.50 29.1% 2.0% 0.93
Lewiston-Auburn, Maine 42.7% 20.4% 0.52 26.9% 8.3% 0.69
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek, Mich. 42.7% 23.1% 0.46 22.5% 7.3% 0.68
Springfield, Mo. 42.6% 15.3% 0.64 17.6% 2.9% 0.84
Las Cruces, N.M. 42.6% 29.8% 0.30 25.3% 0.1% 1.00
Alexandria, La. 42.6% 22.0% 0.48 25.9% 5.1% 0.80
Sarasota-Bradenton, Fla. 42.6% 19.8% 0.53 20.4% 0.6% 0.97
Mobile, Ala. 42.5% 12.9% 0.70 28.5% 5.7% 0.80
Beaumont-Port Arthur, Texas 42.5% 21.8% 0.49 28.3% 5.6% 0.80
Sharon, Pa. 42.5% 15.6% 0.63 17.3% 12.5% 0.28
Stockton-Lodi, Calif. 42.5% 33.6% 0.21 23.5% 6.5% 0.72
Greensboro/Winston-Salem/
High Point, N.C. 42.5% 18.4% 0.57 21.5% 1.6% 0.93
Greenville, N.C. 42.5% 24.2% 0.43 21.5% 4.5% 0.79
Corvallis, Ore. 42.4% 23.3% 0.45 23.4% 0.0% 1.00
Providence-Fall River-
Warwick, R.I.-Mass. 42.4% 21.7% 0.49 24.5% 4.7% 0.81
San Diego, Calif. 42.4% 25.1% 0.41 24.3% 1.9% 0.92
Corpus Christi, Texas 42.3% 43.1% -0.02 27.8% 6.1% 0.78
Bloomington-Normal, Ill. 42.3% 24.3% 0.43 24.7% 8.5% 0.65
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Bangor, Maine 42.2% 14.1% 0.67 27.5% 0.0% 1.00
Tallahassee, Fla. 42.2% 26.9% 0.36 28.3% 3.4% 0.88
Merced, Calif. 42.1% 24.5% 0.42 26.1% 0.0% 1.00
Dover, Del. 42.1% 0.2% 0.99 21.5% 0.0% 1.00
Topeka, Kan. 42.1% 37.9% 0.10 21.0% 13.8% 0.34
Amarillo, Texas 42.0% 25.3% 0.40 26.0% 8.8% 0.66
St. Joseph, Mo. 42.0% 25.9% 0.38 26.3% 19.0% 0.28
Wheeling, W. Va.-Ohio 42.0% 23.9% 0.43 24.6% 2.3% 0.91
Orange County, Calif. 41.9% 34.8% 0.17 22.1% 4.6% 0.79
Los Angeles-Long Beach, Calif. 41.9% 31.5% 0.25 29.7% 12.5% 0.58
Decatur, Ala. 41.8% 11.1% 0.73 26.9% 2.0% 0.92
Dallas, Texas 41.7% 21.4% 0.49 23.0% 4.6% 0.80
Lafayette, La. 41.6% 12.3% 0.71 26.8% 3.7% 0.86
Dayton-Springfield, Ohio 41.6% 27.2% 0.35 21.2% 10.1% 0.52
Pine Bluff, Ark. 41.5% 22.9% 0.45 24.7% 9.3% 0.62
Columbia, S.C. 41.5% 30.6% 0.26 21.2% 8.7% 0.59
Duluth-Superior, Minn.-Wis. 41.5% 34.4% 0.17 26.8% 21.3% 0.21
Grand Forks, N.D.-Minn. 41.5% 7.6% 0.82 25.0% 0.0% 1.00
Daytona Beach, Fla. 41.3% 20.5% 0.50 24.5% 4.6% 0.81
Hattiesburg, Miss. 41.3% 12.1% 0.71 24.5% 10.7% 0.57
Cumberland, Md.-W. Va. 41.2% 14.6% 0.65 23.8% 4.7% 0.80
McAllen-Edinburg-
Mission, Texas 41.2% 20.6% 0.50 19.1% 0.0% 1.00
State College, Pa. 41.2% 18.2% 0.56 27.6% 7.9% 0.71
Binghamton, N.Y. 41.2% 25.7% 0.38 26.2% 6.2% 0.77
Gainesville, Fla. 41.2% 35.1% 0.15 25.9% 3.6% 0.86
Asheville, N.C. 41.1% 30.3% 0.26 25.2% 1.0% 0.96
Youngstown-Warren, Ohio 41.1% 13.9% 0.66 26.0% 6.5% 0.75
Lincoln, Neb. 41.1% 19.4% 0.53 19.7% 4.0% 0.80
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria, Ohio 41.1% 16.1% 0.61 21.5% 7.5% 0.65
Panama City, Fla. 41.0% 18.6% 0.55 25.5% 9.3% 0.64
Ventura, Calif. 41.0% 33.2% 0.19 26.6% 3.9% 0.85
San Luis Obispo-Atasc.-
Paso Robles, Calif. 41.0% 12.2% 0.70 21.7% 0.0% 1.00
Erie, Pa. 40.9% 22.2% 0.46 25.5% 13.2% 0.48
Lakeland-Winter Haven, Fla. 40.8% 24.6% 0.40 24.4% 3.7% 0.85
Raleigh-Durham-
Chapel Hill, N.C. 40.8% 17.2% 0.58 23.3% 1.5% 0.94
Johnstown, Pa. 40.7% 7.8% 0.81 22.0% 0.2% 0.99
Elmira, N.Y. 40.7% 30.3% 0.26 25.8% 8.6% 0.67
Salinas, Calif. 40.7% 26.7% 0.34 22.5% 9.6% 0.57
Knoxville, Tenn. 40.7% 24.3% 0.40 25.8% 5.9% 0.77
Owensboro, Ky. 40.6% 39.4% 0.03 26.7% 18.3% 0.31
Pocatello, Idaho 40.6% 27.3% 0.33 25.9% 0.0% 1.00
Orlando, Fla. 40.6% 22.3% 0.45 19.4% 3.7% 0.81
Grand Junction, Colo. 40.5% 19.7% 0.52 24.6% 0.0% 1.00
Austin-San Marcos, Texas 40.5% 16.8% 0.59 22.9% 4.0% 0.83
Peoria-Pekin, Ill. 40.5% 20.8% 0.49 20.5% 4.7% 0.77
El Paso, Texas 40.4% 37.7% 0.07 22.9% 15.6% 0.32
Danville, Va. 40.4% 20.3% 0.50 22.8% 7.0% 0.69
Medford-Ashland, Ore. 40.4% 16.5% 0.59 25.0% 11.4% 0.54
Billings, Mont. 40.4% 23.3% 0.42 25.9% 10.4% 0.60
Huntsville, Ala. 40.4% 18.1% 0.55 21.8% 5.5% 0.75
Clarksville-Hopkinsville, 
Tenn.-Ky. 40.3% 27.1% 0.33 23.1% 4.1% 0.82
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Jackson, Tenn. 40.3% 26.2% 0.35 26.5% 18.5% 0.30
Gadsden, Ala 40.3% 26.4% 0.34 23.5% 0.0% 1.00
Pittsburgh, Pa. 40.3% 19.7% 0.51 25.7% 2.0% 0.92
Tucson, Ariz. 40.2% 30.9% 0.23 24.9% 5.0% 0.80
Minneapolis-
St. Paul, Minn.-Wis. 40.2% 12.3% 0.69 18.4% 3.8% 0.79
Naples, Fla. 40.2% 3.0% 0.93 21.6% 0.4% 0.98
Oklahoma City, Okla. 40.2% 27.6% 0.31 25.1% 4.7% 0.81
Albany-Schenectady-
Troy, N.Y. 40.2% 19.8% 0.51 20.7% 7.3% 0.65
Jacksonville, Fla. 40.2% 22.0% 0.45 19.9% 4.7% 0.76
Sherman-Denison, Texas 40.2% 35.1% 0.13 25.1% 16.2% 0.36
Columbia, Mo. 40.1% 29.9% 0.26 25.1% 18.2% 0.28
Appleton-Oshkosh-
Neenah, Wis. 40.1% 7.9% 0.80 21.1% 2.1% 0.90
Wichita, Kan. 40.1% 29.0% 0.28 19.6% 7.4% 0.62
Fort Collins-Loveland, Colo. 40.1% 28.3% 0.29 22.9% 13.0% 0.43
Lawrence, Kan. 40.0% 15.5% 0.61 25.8% 0.7% 0.97
Champaign-Urbana, Ill. 40.0% 33.3% 0.17 26.6% 9.3% 0.65
St. Cloud, Minn. 40.0% 6.7% 0.83 19.6% 6.1% 0.69
Eugene-Springfield, Ore. 39.9% 35.1% 0.12 25.6% 11.6% 0.55
Madison, Wis. 39.9% 29.9% 0.25 21.9% 5.5% 0.75
Anniston, Ala. 39.9% 18.4% 0.54 23.7% 1.6% 0.93
Norfolk-Virginia Beach-
Newport News, Va.-N.C. 39.9% 18.4% 0.54 19.4% 4.5% 0.77
Biloxi-Gulfport-
Pascagoula, Miss. 39.9% 10.8% 0.73 24.9% 4.2% 0.83
Waterloo-Cedar Falls, Iowa 39.9% 27.9% 0.30 24.2% 9.0% 0.63
Chattanooga, Tenn.-Ga. 39.9% 19.0% 0.52 25.0% 14.7% 0.41
Texarkana, Texas-Ark. 39.8% 19.9% 0.50 23.7% 1.9% 0.92
Allentown-Bethlehem-
Easton, Pa. 39.8% 10.4% 0.74 20.3% 2.3% 0.89
Las Vegas, Nev.-Ariz. 39.8% 20.0% 0.50 19.1% 2.2% 0.89
Pensacola, Fla. 39.8% 24.2% 0.39 24.4% 10.2% 0.58
Tyler, Texas 39.7% 18.4% 0.54 25.3% 12.9% 0.49
Boise City, Idaho 39.7% 23.2% 0.42 18.4% 11.8% 0.36
Mansfield, Ohio 39.7% 25.7% 0.35 24.3% 4.9% 0.80
Chico-Paradise, Calif. 39.6% 20.4% 0.48 22.4% 0.0% 1.00
Spokane, Wash. 39.6% 49.1% -0.24 24.5% 20.2% 0.18
Harrisburg-Lebanon-
Carlisle, Pa. 39.6% 11.8% 0.70 18.9% 1.4% 0.93
Punta Gorda, Fla. 39.6% 6.3% 0.84 22.9% 0.0% 1.00
New London-
Norwich, Conn.-R.I. 39.6% 15.4% 0.61 22.2% 3.1% 0.86
Baton Rouge, La. 39.6% 13.6% 0.66 26.3% 4.5% 0.83
Decatur, Ill. 39.6% 46.4% -0.17 24.8% 25.2% -0.02
Lynchburg, Va. 39.6% 12.8% 0.68 24.7% 4.6% 0.81
Buffalo-Niagara Falls, N.Y. 39.5% 23.3% 0.41 25.7% 6.6% 0.74
Augusta-Aiken, Ga.-S.C. 39.5% 21.4% 0.46 25.6% 5.9% 0.77
Myrtle Beach, S.C. 39.5% 12.1% 0.69 22.5% 0.7% 0.97
Casper, Wyo. 39.5% 29.3% 0.26 24.5% 18.5% 0.24
Springfield, Ill. 39.5% 25.1% 0.36 19.4% 10.1% 0.48
Johnson City-Kingsport-
Bristol, Tenn.-Va. 39.5% 16.7% 0.58 22.6% 2.2% 0.90
Montgomery, Ala. 39.4% 25.2% 0.36 25.4% 14.1% 0.45
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Rochester, N.Y. 39.4% 18.4% 0.53 20.5% 5.5% 0.73
Lubbock, Texas 39.4% 35.6% 0.10 22.5% 16.0% 0.29
Monroe, La. 39.3% 22.5% 0.43 24.6% 13.9% 0.44
Flagstaff, Utah-Ariz. 39.3% 17.4% 0.56 24.3% 4.7% 0.81
Rapid City, S.D. 39.3% 35.0% 0.11 22.5% 0.0% 1.00
Macon, Ga. 39.3% 49.9% -0.27 25.8% 14.0% 0.46
Tampa-St. Petersburg-
Clearwater, Fla. 39.3% 21.6% 0.45 23.6% 0.8% 0.96
Kokomo, Ind. 39.3% 25.5% 0.35 19.9% 9.7% 0.51
Jackson, Mich. 39.2% 24.2% 0.38 20.5% 6.1% 0.70
Anchorage, Alaska 39.2% 29.6% 0.25 23.2% 7.4% 0.68
Salt Lake City-Ogden, Utah 39.2% 37.2% 0.05 20.4% 8.0% 0.61
Fort Wayne, Ind. 39.2% 17.1% 0.56 18.5% 7.0% 0.62
Miami, Fla. 39.2% 28.4% 0.27 25.5% 9.3% 0.64
Athens, Ga. 39.2% 22.3% 0.43 24.4% 12.3% 0.50
San Jose, Calif. 39.2% 34.8% 0.11 24.0% 8.5% 0.65
Savannah, Ga. 39.0% 17.7% 0.55 24.9% 4.9% 0.80
Brownsville-Harlingen-
San Benito, Texas 39.0% 21.5% 0.45 29.6% 1.0% 0.97
Fayetteville-Springdale-
Rogers, Ark. 38.9% 8.9% 0.77 23.4% 0.0% 1.00
Nashville, Tenn. 38.9% 27.6% 0.29 19.2% 5.3% 0.72
St. Louis, Mo.-Ill. 38.8% 15.1% 0.61 19.8% 4.8% 0.76
Killeen-Temple, Texas 38.8% 21.4% 0.45 21.6% 0.7% 0.97
Lafayette, Ind. 38.8% 40.6% -0.05 24.2% 8.3% 0.66
Florence, Ala. 38.8% 16.0% 0.59 22.7% 2.2% 0.90
Benton Harbor, Mich. 38.8% 17.1% 0.56 25.0% 8.3% 0.67
Lansing-East Lansing, Mich. 38.7% 23.3% 0.40 19.9% 10.9% 0.45
Shreveport-Bossier City, La. 38.7% 36.7% 0.05 22.8% 20.1% 0.12
Victoria, Texas 38.7% 38.2% 0.01 23.7% 0.9% 0.96
Greenville-Spartanburg-
Anderson, S.C. 38.7% 15.5% 0.60 24.2% 5.2% 0.79
Jackson, Miss. 38.6% 22.1% 0.43 25.0% 13.0% 0.48
Jonesboro, Ark. 38.6% 9.0% 0.77 22.0% 0.0% 1.00
West Palm Beach-
Boca Raton, Fla. 38.6% 19.9% 0.48 25.9% 2.7% 0.90
Pittsfield, Mass. 38.6% 31.0% 0.20 24.9% 13.8% 0.45
Wilmington, N.C. 38.6% 15.3% 0.60 24.2% 8.0% 0.67
Tulsa, Okla. 38.5% 24.0% 0.38 23.8% 2.0% 0.92
Fargo-Moorhead, N.D.-Minn. 38.5% 46.6% -0.21 23.7% 0.0% 1.00
Cincinnati, Ohio-Ky.-Ind. 38.5% 17.8% 0.54 19.8% 6.8% 0.66
Charlottesville, Va. 38.5% 23.9% 0.38 20.3% 2.5% 0.87
Reading, Pa. 38.5% 12.1% 0.69 19.3% 3.7% 0.81
Sioux Falls, S.D. 38.4% 37.6% 0.02 17.0% 0.0% 1.00
Bloomington, Ind. 38.4% 41.4% -0.08 22.8% 0.6% 0.98
Columbus, Ohio 38.4% 22.9% 0.40 19.0% 10.0% 0.47
Lexington, Ky. 38.3% 28.8% 0.25 24.3% 3.9% 0.84
Hickory-Morganton, N.C. 38.2% 12.1% 0.68 22.6% 0.0% 1.00
Seattle-Bellevue-Everett, Wash. 38.2% 26.5% 0.31 20.8% 2.3% 0.89
Fayetteville, N.C. 38.2% 20.5% 0.46 23.1% 8.0% 0.65
Birmingham, Ala. 38.1% 25.7% 0.33 24.7% 9.4% 0.62
Richland-Kennewick-
Pasco, Wash. 38.1% 26.6% 0.30 19.3% 0.0% 1.00
Phoenix-Mesa, Ariz. 38.0% 30.0% 0.21 18.3% 8.5% 0.53
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Hartford, Conn. 37.9% 15.6% 0.59 22.2% 4.0% 0.82
Omaha, Neb.-Iowa 37.9% 16.3% 0.57 17.9% 3.6% 0.80
Evansville-Henderson, Ind.-Ky. 37.9% 22.9% 0.40 23.7% 1.2% 0.95
Fort Smith, Ark.-Okla. 37.9% 18.1% 0.52 21.2% 4.3% 0.80
Dothan, Ala. 37.7% 28.4% 0.25 22.5% 2.2% 0.90
Rockford, Ill. 37.7% 16.6% 0.56 18.8% 6.7% 0.65
Portland, Maine 37.7% 25.2% 0.33 18.9% 5.3% 0.72
Waco, Texas 37.7% 24.7% 0.34 22.6% 4.9% 0.78
Honolulu, Hawaii 37.7% 29.7% 0.21 21.3% 2.5% 0.88
Santa Fe, N.M. 37.6% 40.1% -0.06 25.5% 0.0% 1.00
Sioux City, Iowa-Neb. 37.6% 38.6% -0.02 22.2% 27.5% -0.24
Great Falls, Mont. 37.6% 32.3% 0.14 20.2% 6.6% 0.67
Toledo, Ohio 37.6% 19.2% 0.49 23.9% 9.9% 0.58
Albuquerque, N.M. 37.6% 30.1% 0.20 23.3% 2.5% 0.89
Syracuse, N.Y. 37.6% 22.2% 0.41 24.0% 8.5% 0.65
Charleston-
North Charleston, S.C. 37.6% 18.3% 0.51 23.7% 4.1% 0.83
Charlotte-Gastonia-
Rock Hill, N.C.-S.C. 37.6% 24.5% 0.35 23.7% 8.5% 0.64
Ocala, Fla. 37.6% 6.7% 0.82 19.1% 0.8% 0.96
Saginaw-Bay City-
Midland, Mich. 37.6% 24.1% 0.36 23.2% 8.2% 0.65
Glens Falls, N.Y. 37.5% 6.4% 0.83 22.2% 0.0% 1.00
Indianapolis, Ind. 37.5% 20.5% 0.45 24.7% 6.2% 0.75
Little Rock-North 
Little Rock, Ark. 37.5% 20.9% 0.44 23.2% 1.6% 0.93
Pueblo, Colo. 37.5% 24.6% 0.34 20.4% 10.8% 0.47
Roanoke, Va. 37.4% 19.5% 0.48 22.7% 9.8% 0.57
Elkhart-Goshen, Ind. 37.4% 8.9% 0.76 17.1% 2.9% 0.83
Sumter, S.C. 37.4% 42.6% -0.14 21.1% 0.0% 1.00
Altoona, Pa. 37.4% 15.2% 0.59 21.0% 10.1% 0.52
Lima, Ohio 37.3% 15.3% 0.59 22.8% 7.3% 0.68
Rochester, Minn. 37.3% 4.9% 0.87 19.9% 0.0% 1.00
Memphis, Tenn.-Ark.-Miss. 37.3% 14.6% 0.61 24.1% 5.7% 0.76
Milwaukee-Waukesha, Wis. 37.3% 11.7% 0.69 25.0% 5.0% 0.80
San Angelo, Texas 37.3% 33.3% 0.11 20.6% 20.6% 0.00
San Antonio, Texas 37.3% 21.4% 0.43 20.6% 4.2% 0.79
Barnstable-Yarmouth, Mass. 37.2% 13.7% 0.63 24.5% 0.0% 1.00
Yuma, Ariz. 37.1% 29.0% 0.22 18.8% 0.0% 1.00
Joplin, Mo. 37.1% 16.7% 0.55 19.8% 0.0% 1.00
Iowa City, Iowa 37.1% 25.4% 0.32 24.3% 9.9% 0.59
Santa Barbara-Santa 
Maria-Lompoc, Calif. 37.1% 45.3% -0.22 24.7% 0.1% 0.99
Santa Cruz-
Watsonville, Calif. 37.1% 25.2% 0.32 24.7% 0.0% 1.00
Santa Rosa, Calif. 37.1% 18.2% 0.51 24.7% 0.0% 1.00
Bellingham, Wash. 37.1% 20.2% 0.45 23.2% 0.0% 1.00
Jamestown, N.Y. 36.9% 18.8% 0.49 20.0% 8.2% 0.59
Janesville-Beloit, Wis. 36.9% 14.5% 0.61 23.4% 2.9% 0.88
Modesto, Calif. 36.8% 21.2% 0.42 23.2% 0.7% 0.97
Atlanta, Ga. 36.8% 18.3% 0.50 20.1% 2.9% 0.86
Bismarck, N.D. 36.8% 26.6% 0.28 22.2% 0.0% 1.00
Reno, Nev. 36.7% 40.0% -0.09 24.1% 0.4% 0.99
York, Pa. 36.7% 13.5% 0.63 23.4% 4.9% 0.79
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Barre-Hazleton, Pa. 36.7% 12.0% 0.67 20.7% 3.2% 0.85
Wausau, Wis. 36.7% 7.2% 0.80 23.6% 0.0% 1.00
Redding, Calif. 36.7% 10.6% 0.71 20.1% 0.0% 1.00
Enid, Okla. 36.7% 21.2% 0.42 20.1% 0.0% 1.00
Eau Claire, Wis. 36.7% 9.3% 0.75 21.3% 0.0% 1.00
Kansas City, Mo.-Kan. 36.6% 20.4% 0.44 23.6% 5.0% 0.79
Visalia-Tulare-
Porterville, Calif. 36.6% 18.3% 0.50 20.1% 0.0% 1.00
Cheyenne, Wyo. 36.6% 42.6% -0.17 21.2% 0.0% 1.00
La Crosse, Wis.-Minn. 36.6% 53.2% -0.45 21.6% 16.3% 0.24
Portland-
Vancouver, Ore.-Wash. 36.5% 20.7% 0.43 23.6% 1.3% 0.94
Canton-Massillon, Ohio 36.5% 13.3% 0.64 22.1% 4.0% 0.82
Richmond-Petersburg, Va. 36.5% 24.3% 0.33 23.8% 8.7% 0.63
Longview-Marshall, Texas 36.4% 26.8% 0.26 20.9% 6.4% 0.69
Terre Haute, Ind. 36.4% 29.6% 0.19 19.9% 4.7% 0.76
Parkersburg-Marietta, 
W. Va.-Ohio 36.4% 26.5% 0.27 19.3% 0.0% 1.00
Laredo, Texas 36.3% 20.3% 0.44 27.0% 0.0% 1.00
Davenport-Moline-
Rock Island, Iowa-Ill. 36.2% 27.8% 0.23 21.8% 6.7% 0.69
Melbourne-Titusville-
Palm Bay, Fla. 36.2% 30.8% 0.15 21.4% 0.4% 0.98
Grand Rapids-
Muskegon- Holland, Mich. 36.1% 21.8% 0.40 23.6% 7.9% 0.66
South Bend, Ind. 36.1% 25.6% 0.29 21.7% 7.8% 0.64
Green Bay, Wis. 36.0% 19.0% 0.47 23.2% 8.5% 0.63
Lawton, Okla. 35.8% 47.4% -0.32 20.4% 3.5% 0.83
Cedar Rapids, Iowa 35.8% 20.1% 0.44 22.9% 9.4% 0.59
Des Moines, Iowa 35.8% 54.2% -0.51 22.9% 12.2% 0.47
Abilene, Texas 35.8% 29.3% 0.18 19.1% 0.2% 0.99
Williamsport, Pa. 35.8% 14.9% 0.58 18.7% 0.0% 1.00
Lancaster, Pa. 35.7% 7.2% 0.80 22.6% 0.6% 0.97
Dubuque, Iowa 35.7% 23.6% 0.34 20.1% 17.9% 0.11
Fort Lauderdale, Fla. 35.5% 21.5% 0.39 20.0% 7.4% 0.63
Fort Myers-Cape Coral, Fla. 35.5% 10.4% 0.71 20.0% 0.1% 0.99
Fort Pierce-
Port St. Lucie, Fla. 35.5% 22.3% 0.37 20.0% 3.0% 0.85
Fort Walton Beach, Fla. 35.5% 11.4% 0.68 20.0% 0.0% 1.00
Provo-Orem, Utah 35.4% 7.7% 0.78 22.2% 1.7% 0.92
Burlington, Vt. 35.4% 16.7% 0.53 23.1% 8.4% 0.64
Sheboygan, Wis. 35.3% 7.5% 0.79 22.1% 0.0% 1.00
Colorado Springs, Colo. 35.2% 39.8% -0.13 22.2% 3.0% 0.87
Goldsboro, N.C. 35.1% 15.9% 0.55 19.2% 1.0% 0.95
Wichita Falls, Texas 34.6% 36.5% -0.05 18.7% 23.6% -0.26
Jacksonville, N.C. 33.6% 8.1% 0.76 15.8% 0.0% 1.00
Source: Milken Institute, based on U.S. Census 2000, CRA 2001, and FDIC 2001148 James R. Barth, Glenn Yago, and Betsy Zeidman
Establishment: A single physical location where business is conducted or
where services or industrial operations are performed.
Employment: Paid employment consists of full- and part-time employ-
ees, including salaried officers and executives of corporations, who were
on the payroll in the pay period including March 12. Included are
employees on sick leave, holidays, and vacations; not included are propri-
etors and partners of unincorporated businesses.
Annual payroll: Total annual payroll includes all forms of compensation,
such as salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses, vacation allowances, sick-
leave pay, and the value of payments in-kind (for example, free meals and
lodgings) paid during the year to all employees.
Receipts: (Net taxes) the revenue for goods produced, goods distributed,
or services provided, including revenue earned from premiums, commis-
sions and fees, rents, interest, dividends, and royalties. Receipts exclude
all revenue collected for local, state, and federal taxes. Receipts are
acquired from the Economic Census data for establishments in industries
that are in-scope to the Economic Census; receipts are acquired from IRS
tax data for single-establishment businesses in industries that are out-of-
scope to the Economic Census; payroll-to-receipts ratios are used to
estimate receipts for multiestablishment businesses in industries that are
out-of-scope to the Economic Census. Statistics of U.S. Businesses has
receipts for 1997 only.
Enterprise: A business organization consisting of one or more domes-
tic establishments that were specified under common ownership or
control. The enterprise and the establishment are the same for single-
establishment firms. Each multiestablishment company forms one
enterprise—the enterprise employment and annual payroll are summed
from the associated establishments.
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Firm: A business organization consisting of one or more domestic estab-
lishments in the same state and industry that were specified under
common ownership or control. The firm and the establishment are the
same for single-establishment firms. For each multiestablishment firm,
establishments in the same industry within a state will be counted as one
firm—the firm employment and annual payroll are summed from the
associated establishments. 
Enterprise size: Enterprise size designations are determined by the
summed employment of all associated establishments. The enterprise size
group “zero” includes enterprises for which no associated establishments
reported paid employees in the mid-March pay period but paid employ-
ees at some time during the year.
Establishment births: Establishments that have zero employment in the
first quarter of the initial year and positive employment in the first
quarter of the subsequent year. 
Establishment deaths: Establishments that have positive employment in
the first quarter of the initial year and zero employment in the first
quarter of the subsequent year.
Establishment expansions: Establishments that have positive first-
quarter employment in both the initial and subsequent years and increase
employment during the time period between the first quarter of the initial
year and the first quarter of the subsequent year.
Establishment contractions: Establishments that have positive first-
quarter employment in both the initial and subsequent years and decrease
employment during the time period between the first quarter of the initial
year and the first quarter of the subsequent year.
Metropolitan statistical area (MSA): An integrated economic and social
unit with a large population nucleus. Each MSA consists of one or more
counties or statistically equivalent areas meeting published standards of
population and metropolitan character; in the six New England states
Appendix 2 (cont.)
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(Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
and Vermont), cities and towns (rather than counties) are used as the
component geographic units. 
Legal Form of Organization (LFO):
a.  Corporations: Enterprises legally incorporated under state laws.
b. Partnerships: Unincorporated enterprises owned by two or more
persons having financial interest in the business. 
c.  Sole proprietorships: Unincorporated enterprises owned by one person. 
d.  Nonprofit organizations: Enterprises with nonprofit status (tax-exempt). 
e.  Other (associations, trust, joint ventures, estates, etc.): Enterprises
that are formed by other legal form of organization. 
f.  Unknown: Enterprises with unknown legal form of organization. 
Appendix 2 (cont.)
 Endnotes
1Firms can contain multiple establishments that are defined by the U.S. Census
Bureau as a “single physical location at which business is conducted.” See Appendix 2
for definitions of these and other terms frequently used in studies of entrepreneurship.
2However, unlike Table 1, this table goes beyond simply the number of firms
with paid employees. As Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, Krizan, Miranda, and Nucci
(2005) carefully explain, the data sources for the two tables are quite different.
Table 2 includes those firms in Table 1, but also adds all sole proprietorships
without employees and other corporations, partnerships, and other nonemployer
business entities, of which there were more than 17,000 in 2002.
3According to the U.S. Census Bureau, LI individuals in a given MSA are indi-
viduals with annual income of 50 percent or less of that MSA’s median income,
and LMI individuals are those with incomes that are 80 percent or less of the
median income in that MSA.
4LI communities consist of census tracts where the median family income of that
census tract is less than 50 percent of the MSA median family income. The LMI
category consists of census tracts where the median family income of the census
tract is less than 80 percent of the MSA median family income.
5However, the CRA data are not without limitations, including the fact that
loans may be made to a firm with an address in an LMI community, but the
proceeds are used to fund operations—in the case of a firm with multiple establish-
ments—outside LMI communities.
6However, Lucas (1978) argues that smaller businesses have less managerial
talent, and, therefore, one would expect to find that smaller businesses likely are to
be located in regions with lower levels of income per capita.
7For further discussion of credit enhancement as a potential alleviator of the capital
access “gaps” facing LMI businesses, see Yago, Zeidman, and Schmidt (2003). 
8For further discussion of the role of securitization, see Yago, Zeidman, and
Schmidt (2003). 
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